主管：中国科学院
主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
　　　中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院
中国管理科学

• •    

碳标签制度下考虑竞争与消费者异质性的企业最优策略选择与机制设计

金帅, 丁晨冲, 沈佳丽   

  1. 江苏大学 管理学院；南京大学 社会科学计算实验中心, 江苏 212013 中国
  • 收稿日期:2024-12-19 修回日期:2025-10-26 接受日期:2026-01-01
  • 通讯作者: 金帅
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71974081); 国家自然科学基金项目(92046022); 国家社科基金重点项目(22AGL028); 江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX24_3908)

Optimal Strategy Selection and Mechanism Design for Firms Considering Competition and Consumer Heterogeneity under a Carbon Labelling System

JIN Shuai   

  1. , 212013, China
  • Received:2024-12-19 Revised:2025-10-26 Accepted:2026-01-01
  • Contact: Shuai, JIN

PDF (PC)

0

摘要： 在碳减排标签和碳足迹标签机制下，通过构建考虑竞争与消费者异质性的博弈模型，系统剖析了企业在两类碳标签认证机制下的最优决策行为；进一步从机制设计层面，基于环境改进最大化、消费者剩余最大化、经济产出最大化以及社会福利最大化决策准则，深入探究了认证机构对于碳减排标签最优认证标准的确定问题以及碳标签机制的选择问题。研究结果表明：（1）无论是碳减排标签机制，还是碳足迹标签机制，都存在适宜实施的环境边界。（2）当满足实施条件时，不论认证机构实行哪种认证机制，均将形成竞争企业实行差异化低碳运营策略的博弈均衡。（3）在碳减排标签认证机制下，认证机构设定宽松的碳标签认证标准有利于激励企业绿色化转型，而过于严格的碳标签认证标准将导致垄断市场的出现，企业丧失生产碳减排标签产品的动力。（4）在四种不同的机制设计决策准则下，认证机构实行碳减排标签认证机制均是更优的策略选择，通过灵活调整碳减排标签认证标准能够实现不同决策准则下的最优目标。此外，碳标签认证机构科学确立合理的机制设计决策准则对于碳减排标签机制的有效实施也是至关重要的。

关键词: 异质性需求, 碳标签制度, 企业竞争, 碳标签标准, 投资减排成本

Abstract: Under the mechanisms of carbon emission reduction labelling and carbon footprint labelling, this paper systematically analyzes firms' optimal decision-making behaviors by constructing a theoretical model considering competition and consumer heterogeneity. Furthermore, from the perspective of mechanism design, this paper thoroughly explores the issue of determining the optimal certification standard of carbon emission reduction labels and the choice of carbon labelling mechanism by certification authority, based on the decision criteria of maximizing environmental improvement, maximizing consumer surplus, maximizing economic output, and maximizing social welfare. The results of the study show that: (1) Both the carbon reduction labelling mechanism and the carbon footprint labeling mechanism have specific boundaries within which they are suitable for implementation; (2) When the implementation conditions are met, regardless of the certification mechanism implemented by the certification authority, the game equilibrium emerges where competing firms adopt differentiated low-carbon operation strategies. (3) Under the carbon emission reduction labelling mechanism, a lenient carbon labelling standard set by the certification authority is conducive to incentivizing the green transformation of firms, while an overly stringent carbon labelling standard will lead to the emergence of a monopoly market, and firms will lose the incentive to produce carbon labelled products. (4) Based on the four different mechanism design decision criteria, it is always the optimal strategy for certification authority to implement the carbon emission reduction labelling certification mechanism, in which case the certification authority can flexibly adjust the carbon labelling certification standards to achieve the optimal objectives under the respective decision criteria at different levels. Additionally, it is crucial for the effective implement of carbon emission reduction labelling that certification authority scientifically establishes appropriate decision criteria of mechanism designs.

Key words: heterogeneous demand, carbon labelling system, competition firms, carbon labelling standard, cost of investment in emission reduction