关键词: 产品质量, 质量投资成本共担, 工艺竞争力, 非合作-合作两型博弈

Abstract: As China’s economy enters the stage of high-quality development, the manufacturing industry is undergoing a critical period of transformation and upgrading. Driven by national policies and market demand, manufacturing enterprises are striving to enhance quality and efficiency to strengthen industrial competitiveness. The improvement of product quality relies, in part, on the supply of high-performance components. However, component suppliers often face high investment costs and significant risks in the process of quality improvement, which weakens their motivation to enhance quality. To address this issue, some manufacturing enterprises, such as Huawei, share investment costs with suppliers and jointly bear risks. Meanwhile, manufacturers' process competitiveness, including process capability and process innovation, also directly affects product quality and production efficiency. Given that product quality is influenced by both component quality levels and manufacturers' process competitiveness, and considering the price decisions and cost-sharing mechanisms between manufacturers and component suppliers, it is worth studying the optimization of strategies such as optimal pricing and optimal process level, as well as the issue of profit distribution. For the quality decision problem of the supply chain consisting of a component supplier and a manufacturer, this paper simultaneously solves the problems of strategy optimization and profit distribution by constructing a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model. First, in the non-cooperative game part, component supplier and manufacturer engage in a Stackelberg game, where their wholesale prices of components, processing levels and retail prices of products form a competitive situation. Second, in the cooperative game part, component supplier and manufacturer cooperate to optimize the component quality level and quality investment cost sharing ratio, applying the Maximin theory and the Shapley value to the profit distribution of supply chain members in any situation. Then, the profit distribution value is used as a payoff function for the non-cooperative game part to solve for the optimal equilibrium strategy and optimal profit. Finally, theoretical analysis and numerical simulation illustrate the effect of parameters such as process innovation capability factor on the equilibrium strategy and optimal profit. The research results show that the enhancement of the manufacturer’s process innovation capability is conducive to the improvement of its own process level and the quality level of components. Manufacturers always prefer to work with component suppliers to encourage them to drive component quality by sharing the cost of their quality investments. Process enhancement focused on improving product quality has a positive impact on product competitiveness and corporate profitability. Only consumers pay attention to product quality can motivate enterprises to continuously optimize their products and achieve effective use of enterprise resources. This research can provide a decision-making reference for enterprises on how to improve the quality of supply chain by conducting competition and cooperation.

Key words: product quality, quality investment cost-sharing, process competitiveness, noncooperative-cooperative biform game