OEM vs.ODM：跨国技术授权与研发决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1735

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文构建外国企业（技术授权方）、本国企业（被授权方）以及原始设备制造商（original equipment manufacturer， OEM）或原始设计制造商（original design manufacturer， ODM）之间的理论模型，探究OEM模式和ODM模式下外国企业的跨国最优授权合同设计、本国企业的新产品研发决策及其影响。研究发现：跨国最优授权合同存在两种不同的形式，即从理论上验证了固定收费、双重收费形式授权合同的存在性。并且，本国企业是否自主研发不会影响外国企业的最优授权合同形式设计，本国企业在利润分配中处于劣势地位；当本国企业的技术水平足够高时，选择OEM模式并自主研发新产品是本国企业的最优策略，这能提高本国企业研发投入积极性，对外国企业也有利。然而，相较于ODM模式，OEM模式下消费者需支付更高的产品溢价，进而可能损害社会福利。最后，对原始模型进行拓展，进一步考虑本国企业选择原始品牌制造商（original brand manufacturer， OBM）模式及其价值。

关键词: 跨国技术授权, 研发决策, OEM, ODM

Abstract:

In the international trade of intellectual property， transnational technology licensing is one of the most important ways of patent technology transfer， and licensing contract is the key to achieve technology licensing cooperation. From the perspective of industry practice and relevant literature， there are three main forms of transnational technology licensing contracts， namely fixed fee licensing contract， royalty licensing contract and two-part tariff licensing contract. How to design and choose transnational technology licensing contract is the key problem that transnational technology licensing must face. However， the rights and obligations of technology licensor and licensee in licensing cooperation are often unequal， which makes the design of technology licensing contract difficult and the decision-making process more complicated. Therefore， it will focus on the following questions in this paper：（i） How should the technology licensor design and select a suitable licensing contract under the OEM and ODM modes （ii） Based on the choice between OEM and ODM modes， is it profitable for the licensee to develop independently （iii） Can independent R&D enhance the licensee's enthusiasm for R&D investment and improve social welfare. It considers a system in this paper， consisting of a foreign innovator， domestic company and ODM or OEM. The foreign innovator licenses patents to the domestic company under specific contracts， enabling it to produce and market products. Given its closer connection to the market， the domestic company has a more accurate grasp of market demand， which is presumed to be its private information. Additionally， the domestic company chooses the production outsourcing mode， including OEM mode and ODM mode. To effectively discern the private information， foreign innovator is necessitated to devise optimal technology licensing contracts， encompassing both royalty and one-time fixed transfer payment.Utilizing the mechanism design theory， two theoretical models are constructed between foreign innovator， domestic company and ODM or OEM. Employing backward induction for the analysis， the pricing， ordering and R&D investment decisions of the domestic company， OEM and ODM in response to the licensing contracts set by foreign innovator are firstly examined. It then evaluates the optimal licensing strategies of foreign innovator under both OEM mode and OEM mode， taking into account the domestic company’s individual participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Further， the equilibrium of the games is used to assess the outsourcing mode selection of the domestic company. Ultimately， the nature of the optimal technology licensing contracts and the value of the domestic company's independent R&D are analyzed.The results show that， the optimal transnational licensing contracts include fixed-fee licensing contract and two-part tariff licensing contract. This conclusion is one of the main innovations of this paper， which theoretically proves the existence of different forms of licensing contracts. Moreover， the design of the optimal licensing contracts form will not be affected by the independent R&D of domestic companies， and domestic companies have a smaller share of profits. When the technical level of domestic companies is high enough， the OEM mode is the best choice， which can stimulate the enthusiasm of domestic company to invest in R&D， and is also beneficial to foreign innovator. However， compared with the ODM mode， consumers in the OEM mode also need to pay higher product price， which may damage social welfare. Finally， based on the theoretical analysis framework and conclusions， the original model is extended and analyzed from the OBM mode. The above theoretical research and conclusions can provide theoretical reference for transnational technology licensing cooperation. In future research， the design of transnational technology licensing contracts in the case of multiple competitive domestic companies is also can be explored.

Key words: transnational technology licensing, R&D investment decision, OEM, ODM

中图分类号:

F274

金亮. OEM vs.ODM：跨国技术授权与研发决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(7): 300-311.

Liang Jin. OEM vs. ODM: Optimal Multinational Technology Licensing and R&D Investment Decisions[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(7): 300-311.

图/表 6

表1

符号设定与说明"

符号	定义与说明
$r$	外国企业决策的版税提成费
$f$	外国企业决策的一次性授权费
$Q$	本国企业决策的产品产量
$w$	OEM或者ODM决策的产品外包生产价格
$I$	本国企业或ODM决策的研发投入额
$u$	产品质量水平
$a i$	消费者对产品的最大支付意愿，代表本国市场需求规模
$v$	消费者对产品的支付意愿
$λ$	消费者关于产品质量的敏感系数
$ε$	市场需求波动或不确定性因素
$p$	产品销售价格
$c$	单位产品生产成本
$k$	本国企业的技术水平

表1

表2

情形B中的最优决策"

$i$	$r i O B M *$	$f i O B M *$	$Q i O B M *$	$I i O B M *$
$H$	0	$B 4 + 1 - ρ σ 2 2 2 - k λ 2 - C$	$a H - c F 2 - λ 2 k$	$k λ 2 a H - c D 2 2 2 - λ 2 k 2$
$L$	$ρ a H - a L 1 - ρ$	$2 - k λ 2 B 3 2 2 1 - ρ 2 + σ 2 2 - C$	$B 3 1 - ρ$	$B 3 2 λ 2 k 2 1 - ρ 2$

表2

图1

图2

图3

图4

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