In this paper, the stackelberg game model is constructed which consists of two competing manufacturers, two retailers and consumers, and it is used to discuss the manufacturer's optimal product distribution channel. Firstly, the consumer utility function model is constructed which depicts product quality difference and channel preference, and the optimal product quality choice and pricing decision about the two manufacturer's are discussed under different channel decisions. Secondly, the influence of channel and brand competition on the manufacturers channel choice and Pareto optimal choice is studied. At last, the influence of channel and brand competition on the quality-price ratio in different channel structure is inspected. The research shows that the customer's channel preferences will influence the manufacturer's channel decisions by affecting the product's quality. When the brand and channel competition come together, they will interact each other and jointly affect the manufacturer's eventually channel choice. The price is positively related to the product's quality. The more intense the channel competition, the less difference between the price of different channel products, the more intense at brand competition in the same channel, the more higher at the price performance of product.
LIN Jing, WANG Jiang
. Research of Manufacturers' Channel Strategy under Dual-channel Supply Chain Based on Differentiated Product[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018
, 26(6)
: 72
-84
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.06.008
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