In this work, information leakage and information distortion in a supply chain under a wholesale price contract are studied and theoretical basis is provided for the player's motivation and decisions in reality. A supply chain consisting of a common supplier and two retailer with different market status, an incumbent and an entrant is considered. The incumbent can privately acquire actual demand state while the supplier and the entrant have no access to learn demand information but know the prior distribution of the demand state. Thus, there exists asymmetric demand information between the incumbent with the supplier and entrant. The paper shows that the supplier always leaks the incumbent's order information to the entrant under a wholesale price contract. The entrant accepts the information being leaked by the supplier to assist order decision. Based on signaling game theory and perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, two equilibrium strategies including the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium under information leakage are included and the ordering strategies of retailers under the different market demand states are shown. Further more, the supplier's and the incumbent's incentive with information distortion are studied and it is found that the supplier has an inventive to distort information to mislead the entrant to make wrong decisions in high demand state under the pooling equilibrium. The supplier and the incumbent more benefit under information distortion, whereas the entrant's profit decreases. Because the entrant earns positive revenue to guarantee business activities, he will remain the market to horizontally compete with the incumbent. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the conclusions and illustrates the impact of information leakage and distortion on the profits of three players.
LIU Hao, FENG Geng-zhong, JIANG Wei, QIAN Gui-sheng
. Research on Business Operation and Decision-making of Players in a Supply Chain under the Distortion of Demand Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018
, 26(4)
: 11
-21
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.04.002
[1] Lee C Y, Yang Ruina. Supply chain contracting with competing suppliers underasymmetric information[J]. ⅡE Transactions, 2013, 45(1):25-52.
[2] Anand K S, Goyal M. Strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain[J]. Management Science, 2009, 55(3):438-452.
[3] 向阳. 国美多渠道融合战略显成效[N]. 科技日报, 2013-8-21(12).
[4] Zhang Chen, Li Suhong. Secure information sharing in internet-based supply chain management systems[J]. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 2006, 46(4):18-24.
[5] 兰军. "强盗式"的家电零供关系还摆的正吗?[N]. 消费日报, 2006-4-7.
[6] 周琳娜. 提供虚假材料投标为何屡罚难止[N]. 中国政府采购报, 2013-7-22.
[7] Lee H L, So K C, Tang C S. The value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain[J]. Management Science, 2000, 46(5):626-643.
[8] Ha A Y, Tong Shilu. Contracting and information sharing under supply chain competition[J]. Management science, 2008, 54(4):701-715.
[9] Cachon G P, Fisher M. Supply chain inventory management and the value of sharedinformation[J]. Management science, 2000, 46(8):1032-1048.
[10] 申悦, 于瑞峰, 吴甦,等. 零售商Bertrand竞争下的供应链成本信息共享价值[J]. 清华大学学报自然科学版, 2005, 45(11):1581-1584.
[11] 陈忠, 艾兴政. 双渠道信息共享与收益分享合同选择[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2008, 28(12):42-51.
[12] 但斌, 周茂森, 张旭梅. 存在竞争性制造商的集团采购供应链需求预测信息的共享与激励[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(3):41-51.
[13] 吴江华, 翟昕. 信息共享对供应链合作广告影响的博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(5):100-107.
[14] 高举红, 滕金辉, 侯丽婷,等. 需求不确定下考虑竞争的闭环供应链定价研究[J]. 系统工程学报, 2017, 32(1).
[15] Li L. Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition[J]. Management Science, 2002, 48(9):1196-1212.
[16] Atallah M J, Elmongui H G, Deshpande V, et al. Secure Supply-Chain Protocols[C]//Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce, Newport Beach, CA, USA, 24-27 June, 2003.
[17] Li L, Zhang Hongtao. Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination[J]. Management science, 2008, 54(8):1467-1481.
[18] Kong G, Rajagopalan S, Zhang Hongtao. Revenue sharing and information leakage in a supply chain[J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(3):556-572.
[19] 张志清, 董绍辉, 西宝,等. 需求信息泄露条件下供应链零售商订货策略研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2010, 19(1):80-88.
[20] 陈志刚. 考虑供应链信息泄露机理下产品回收定价策略研究[D]. 成都:西南交通大学, 2015.
[21] 周建亨, 蒋碧云. 水平竞争条件下的供应链信息泄露策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016,(11):81-93.
[22] 邱小平, 李娜, 马丽娜,等. 考虑信息泄露的供应链成员决策研究[J]. 武汉大学学报(理学版), 2016, 62(3):261-267.
[23] Gerchak Y, Khmelnitsky E. A consignment system where suppliers cannot verify retailer's sales reports[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2003, 83(1):37-43.
[24] Gerchak Y, Khmelnitsky E, Robinson L W. Untruthful probabilistic demand forecasts in vendor-managed revenue-sharing contracts:Coordinating the chain[J]. Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 2007, 54(7):742-749.
[25] Heese H S, Kemahlioglu-Ziya E. Enabling opportunism:Revenue sharing when sales revenues are unobservable[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2014, 23(9):1634-1645.
[26] Wu O Q, Babich V. Unit-contingent power purchase agreement and asymmetric information about plant outage[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2012, 14(2):245-261.
[27] 王蕊. 供应链中需求预测信息共享时零售商扭曲信息的动机分析[J]. 物流技术, 2008, 27(8):161-162.
[28] 周雄伟, 刘鹏超, 陈晓红. 信息不对称条件下双寡头市场中质量差异化产品虚假信息问题研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(3):133-140.
[29] 邓明荣, 卢秀娟. 需求信息不对称下基于信号博弈的双渠道供应链研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2016, 25(4):125-133.
[30] Wang C X, Webster S. Channel coordination for a supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer[J]. Decision Sciences, 2007, 38(3):361-389.
[31] Boyle M. Brand killers[J]. Fortune, 2003, 148(3):51-58.
