Abstract: With the development of economic globalization, competition in the same industry has gradually transformed from competition among enterprises into competition among supply chains. In this context, game models of two competitive retailer-led closed loop supply chains (CLSCs) are studied under three kinds of combinations of collection modes:MR combination, MT combination and RT combination. The equilibrium prices, collection rates, profits of channel members, single chain profits and total profits of two chains under three combinations are derived based on backward induction method. The results of six chains in three combinations are compared by mathematical derivation and numerical examples. The conclusions show that:(1) the increase of the competition intensity makes the retail prices, the collection rates and the market demand increase, and improves the profits of all the chain members. However, it does harm to consumer interests; (2) the orders of selling prices, collection rates, manufacturers' profits, retailers' profits and chain's profits in four chains of MR and MT combinations are irrelevant with the competition intensity between two chains; in contrast, the competition intensity does affect the relations between the equilibrium solutions and manufacturers' and retailers' profits of RT combination and those in MR and MT combination. (3) For either of the two chains, if its competitive chain is manufacturer-collection (retailer-collection), it should form a retailer-collection (manufacturer-collection) chain from the perspective of chain's profit under different collection modes; if its competitive chain is third-party-collection, it should form a manufacturer-collection chain when the competition intensity is lower than a specific threshold, otherwise it should form a retailer-collection one. (4) If the competition between the two chains is moderate, the total profit of the two chains in MR combination is higher than that in MT or RT combination due to its higher collection efficiency; however, when the competition intensity increases gradually, the total profit of the two chains in RT combination will exceed those in RT and MR combination one by one; when the competition between the two chains are extremely fierce, the total profit in MR combination is even lower than that in MT combination. Therefore, the fierce competition has the greatest positive effect on the two chains in RT combination, but has the least positive effect on MR combination. The above conclusions enrich the theory of CLSC competition and can help the manufacturers choose the appropriate collection modes in practice in a chain-to-chain competition environment.

Key words: remanufacturing, different collection modes, retailer-led, competitive closed loop supply chains