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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (5): 192-203.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0355

• Articles • Previous Articles    

Information Disclosure Strategies in the E-Commerce Platform

YU Hang1,2, TIAN Lin3, CHEN Yun4   

  1. 1. School of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China; 2. Post-Doctoral Research Center, Guangdong Shunde Rural Commercial Bank Company Limited, Foshan 528300, China; 3. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China; 4. Shanghai University of Fiuance and Economics Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology, Shanghai 200433, China
  • Received:2019-03-16 Revised:2019-10-31 Published:2022-06-01
  • Contact: 田林 E-mail:tianlin@fudan.edu.cn

Abstract: In the e-commerce platform mode, the supplier determines the product price, sells the product directly to consumers and shares the revenue with the platform. Usually, there exists information asymmetry in product (matching) attributes between consumers and product suppliers/platforms. In reality, a consumer is not certain about whether his private taste matches a product unless firms provide some information, and he will make an expectation about his matchness for that product if no information is provided. To resolve consumers’ fit uncertainty, a seller faces two complicated issues: how to offer product information for consumers and how much?What makes this issue more complicated is that even platforms can directly disclose product information.

Key words: e-commerce platform; information disclosure; attribute (matching) information; competition

CLC Number: