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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (2): 115-124.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.02.015

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A Bargaining-Coordination Mechanism for Green Supply Chain of Wood-based Panel under the Government's Incentive Policy

CHEN Zhi-song1,2,3   

  1. 1. Business School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, China;
    2. Dare Technology Co., Ltd., Zhenjiang 212300, China;
    3. Jiangsu Private Economic Decision Research Base, Nanjing 210023, China
  • Received:2013-10-12 Revised:2014-07-09 Online:2016-02-20 Published:2016-02-25

Abstract: Currently, China's wood based panel(WBP) industry is faced with problems of waste of resources, environmental pollution, and lack of efficient cooperation and coordination. Considering the practice of WBP industry, WBP green supply chain system is defined. Further, based on optimality theory and Stackelberg game theory, a centralized optimization decision model and a decentralized equilibrium decision model of WBP green supply chain under the government's incentive policy of value-added tax refund and environmental tax collection are respectively built. On this basis, combining contract theory and Nash bargaining theory, setting the decentralized equilibrium profit of branch-wood supplier and WBP manufacturer as the disagreement point, a bargaining-coordination model of WBP green supply chain under the government's incentive policy of value-added tax refund and environmental tax collection is built:the branch-wood supplier provides a revenue-cost sharing contract in which the branch-wood supplier charges a lower wholesale price to WBP manufacturer, if the WBP manufacturer accepts this contract, he will share a proportion of his revenue and cost to the supplier. Then, they need to bargain over the revenue-cost sharing rate, which depends on the bargaining power of both sides. After this rate is set, WBP manufacturer will decide the end-price and order quantity, the supplier will produce and deliver branch-wood at a lower wholesale price to WBP manufacturer. Afterwards, WBP manufacturer will share a fraction 1-φ of his revenue and cost to the supplier, where φ is the revenue-cost keeping fraction of the manufacturer, and φ∈[0,1]. And then, the corresponding bargaining-coordination mechanism of revenue-cost sharing contract for WBP green supply chain under the government's incentive is built. Finally, based on the empirical data from industry and enterprise, the numerical analysis is carried out by comparing with the results of traditional WBP supply chain. The results show that:(i) The bargaining-coordination mechanism of revenue-cost sharing contract can effectively achieve coordinated operations, improve resources efficiency, reduce the negative environmental impact and improve the operations performance of WBP green supply chain.(ii) The optimal profits of WBP supply chain and its members under the WBP green supply chain management mode are higher than that under the traditional WBP supply chain management mode; the optimal profits of WBP supply chain and its members under bargaining-coordination decision situations are higher than that under decentralized equilibrium decision situations.(iii) Making policy of value-added tax refund with threshold and suitable environmental tax collection, self-construction of the economic forest farm, choosing the economical branch-wood and enhancing technology R & D and process improvement, are beneficial for improving the operations performance of WBP green supply chain. The bargaining-coordination mechanism of revenue-cost sharing contract built in this paper, providing a more equitable and efficient coordination mechanism for green supply chain operations of traditional manufacturing enterprises, which is a good improvement for the classical method of supply chain contract coordination in the theory, and also a good application reference for other types of green supply chain coordination in the practice.

Key words: government's incentive, wood-based panel, green supply chain, Nash bargaining, coordination

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