针对MRV机制下碳数据质量监管中的风险问题，探究区块链赋能多主体最优行为决策。本文首先剖析了区块链技术对碳数据质量监管情境下多主体行为决策的赋能机制，并利用演化博弈理论和方法构建了政府部门、控排企业和第三方碳核查机构参与的混合策略博弈模型，通过对各方主体的策略稳定性及系统的均衡性进行分析，求解了区块链赋能多主体参与碳数据质量协同管理的有效条件，最后利用数值仿真方法进一步探讨了关键参数对参与主体行为演化的影响。研究发现：（1）以区块链为支撑构建多方节点交互的链上监管体系能够有效缓解碳数据质量监管难题，随着区块链技术的普及和公众环保意识的增强，政府实施区块链监管模式是促进多方共治的前提和趋势；（2）控排企业具有与核查机构合谋投机的主观倾向，应在财税奖励、上链补贴的基础上，大幅提高作假成本与合谋门槛，才能有效规范控排企业诚信减排；（3）信用成本是第三方碳核查机构策略选择的关注重点，但信用成本存在“失效区间”，取值落在区间内会使系统策略演化陷入博弈僵局，完善的多重复查和信用惩罚机制有利于破解这一局面。研究能够为引导碳交易相关主体行为决策，规范碳数据质量管理提供有益借鉴。

Carbon data quality is the lifeline of carbon trading and holds significant implications in realizing the “dual-carbon” strategy objectives. Consequently， in light of the existing risks associated with regulating carbon data quality under the MRV mechanism， the optimal behavior decision-making empowered by blockchain technology for multiple agents is explored. Initially， the enabling mechanism of blockchain technology on the behavior decisions of multiple agents in the context of carbon data quality supervision is dissected. Subsequently， an evolutionary game theory and method are utilized to construct a mixed-strategy game model involving government regulatory authorities， emission-capping enterprises， and third-party carbon verification agencies. By analyzing the stability of the strategies of the various agents and the equilibrium of the system， the effective conditions for collaborative carbon data quality management with the participation of multiple agents empowered by blockchain are solved. Furthermore， referring to policy documents and typical cases， the impact of key parameters on the behavioral evolution of participants is further explored using numerical simulation methods. The research findings indicate that： （1） The construction of an on-chain supervision system with multiple interactions of different nodes supported by blockchain can effectively alleviate the regulatory problems of carbon data quality. With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology and the strengthening of public environmental awareness， the implementation of blockchain regulatory models by the government is a prerequisite and trend for promoting joint governance by multiple parties. （2） Emission-capping enterprises have a subjective tendency to engage in collusion and speculation with the verification agencies. It is necessary to significantly increase the cost of fraud and the threshold for collusion on the basis of fiscal and tax incentives and on-chain subsidies， in order to effectively regulate the integrity of emission-capping enterprises in reducing emissions. （3） The focus of strategy selection for third-party carbon verification agencies is credit cost， but there exists a "failure interval" for credit cost parameters， which may lead to a game deadlock in system strategy evolution. A robust mechanism of multiple reviews and credit penalties is conducive to the verification institutions actively fulfilling their responsibilities and overcoming this situation. This research can help mitigate the risk of carbon data quality supervision under the MRV mechanism， and provide a valuable reference for the effective guidance of behavioral decision-making among carbon trading-related subjects and the regulation of data quality management within the carbon market.