针对存在药农“掺劣”行为的中药材供应链，构建政府四种干预策略（无干预、现金补贴干预、检查处罚干预和现金补贴-检查处罚组合干预）下的中药材供应链博弈模型，对比分析政府不同干预策略下中药材供应链的运作差异，探究政府干预对中药材供应链质量行为决策的影响，并进一步对博弈模型进行拓展研究。结果表明：1) 政府有必要采取干预策略对中药材供应链进行干预，而且三种干预策略均存在使得药农放弃“掺劣”行为的临界条件。2) 政府对中药材供应链进行干预时，不论是加强对中药企业质量检验检测费用的补贴，还是加强对中药企业销售劣质中药材的检查处罚，均利于对药农“掺劣”行为的治理。3) 组合干预策略叠加了现金补贴干预和检查处罚干预策略对药农“掺劣”行为的治理效果，政府应该选择组合干预策略对中药材供应链进行干预。并且，在组合干预策略下，政府可以设置较高的补贴力度，让中药企业获利的同时遏制药农“掺劣”行为，对中药材行业的健康发展做出积极贡献。4) 当药农和中药企业均存在“掺劣”行为时，政府不仅要使得补贴力度或者处罚力度达到阈值，还应该引导消费者重视索赔，进而消除双方的“掺劣”行为。本研究可以为政府设计和选择有针对性的中药材质量干预策略提供参考。

Chinese herbal medicines, as the starting materials for Chinese traditional medicine tablets and Chinese traditional patent medicine, its quality is directly related to the clinical efficacy of Chinese medicine and the revitalization and development of Chinese medicine cause in China. However, the quality of Chinese herbal medicines in China is still worrying. The Annual Report on Drug Quality Failure Data released by Yaozh.com shows that Chinese herbal medicines are the hardest hit area of drug quality failure. As a social problem involving the government, enterprises, farmers and consumers, the quality of Chinese herbal medicines is difficult to be solved by the market mecha-nism alone, which requires the government to play the role of a national management department and carry out government intervention. Therefore, how government intervention will affect the quality behavior decisions of Chinese herbal medicine supply chain members and how the gov-ernment should choose the intervention strategy to promote the quality improvement of Chinese herbal medicines have become urgent questions to be answered. Aiming at the Chinese herbal medicine supply chain in which farmers have the adulteration behavior, this paper constructs game models of the Chinese herbal medicine supply chain under four government intervention strategies, namely, non-intervention, cash subsidy intervention, inspection penalty intervention, and combination of cash subsidy-inspection penalty intervention. Based on the equilibrium results of the four models, firstly, the marginal conditions for farmers to abandon adulteration under different intervention strategies are obtained. Secondly, the impact of govern-ment intervention strategies on the quality behavior decisions of the Chinese herbal medicine supply chain members is analyzed. Finally, the operational differences of the Chinese herbal medicine supply chain under different intervention strategies are demonstrated and the choice option of government intervention strategy with the optimal quality enhancement effect is given. In addition, this paper extends the above models to test the model's robustness and obtains some new significant conclusions. The main findings of this paper are as follows: 1) Government intervention is necessary for the Chinese herbal medicine supply chain, and there are threshold conditions for all three intervention strategies to make farmers abandon adulteration behavior. 2) When the government intervenes in the Chinese herbal medicine supply chain, whether it is strengthening the subsidy for the quality inspection and testing costs of Chinese medicine enterprises or strengthening the inspection penalty for the sale of low-quality Chinese herbal medicines of Chinese medicine enterprises, it will be conducive to the governance of the farmers' adulteration behavior. When the government's subsidy or inspection penalty reaches the threshold, the farmers will abandon adulteration. 3) The combined intervention strategy superimposes the effects of cash subsidy intervention and inspection penalty intervention on the adulteration behavior of farmers. The government should choose the combined intervention strategy to intervene in the Chinese herbal medicine supply chain. Moreover, under the combined intervention strategy, the government can set a high level of subsidy to allow Chinese medicine enterprises to obtain more profits while suppressing the farmers' adulteration behavior, which will contribute positively to the healthy development of the Chinese herbal medicine in-dustry. 4) When both farmers and Chinese medicine enterprises engaged in adulteration, the gov-ernment should not only make the subsidies or penalties reach the threshold, but also guide con-sumers to pay attention to the claims, in order to eliminate the adulteration behavior of both parties. Firstly, this paper can contribute to the development of quality management theory in the Chinese herbal medicine supply chain. Secondly, this paper can provide theoretical references for the government to choose intervention strategies. Finally, this paper can provide a lesson for sub-sequent similar studies in data collection and simulation application.