本文考虑了参与者的公平关切和利他偏好行为，分别构建了固定价格和个体绩效的两种激励契约模式下的委托代理模型，通过模型推演和数值分析，分析了两种激励契约模式下参与者公平关切和利他偏好行为对企业期望效用以及参与者努力水平的影响，并得到公平关切和利他偏好下激励契约设计效果的无差异曲线。研究结果表明，参与者公平关切和利他偏好的不同偏重程度对众包竞赛契约设计的效果有显著的影响：若参与者的公平关切偏好发挥主导作用时，基于个体绩效的激励契约将优于基于固定价格的激励契约；若参与者的利他偏好发挥主导作用时，基于固定价格的激励契约将优于基于个体绩效的激励契约。本文的研究结果可以为企业设计和选择众包竞赛激励契约提供参考依据。

As an innovative organizationform，crowdsourcing contesthas become an important way for many firms to improve their competitiveness.However，due to these contests’ competitive attribute and the participants’ opportunistic tendency， the firms occur concerns whether their problems can be solved through crowdsourcing contest.Therefore，how firms design contract to incentive participants’ effort has become one of the most important and urgent issues in crowdsourcing contest.In order to solve the design problem of incentive contract between the firm and the participants，firstly，the principal-agent models based on the fixed-price awards and absolute performance are established separately when the participants are completely rational.Then， in view of the widespread behavior of decision-makers’ fairness concerns and altruistic preferences in reality，both of them are taken into consideration in the principal-agent model.Finally，in comparison with the principal-agent model with completely rational participants，the effects on the firm’s design of incentive contract and the participants’ efforts are explored arising from fairness concerns and altruistic preferences.In addition，the difference and effectiveness are compared between the incentive contracts based on the fixed-price awards and absolute performance，which can help to solve selection problem of incentive contract occurred by the participants’ bounded rational behavior.It is found that greater fairness concern and altruistic preference contribute to the improvement of firm’s expected utility. However， smaller fairness concern and altruistic preference have negative effects on the expected utility. Although these two preferences don’t necessarily help the firm improve the expected utility， the firm can always choose the optimal incentive contract for accommodating different preferences. For participants’ fairness concern that plays a leading role and is lager， the firm will choose the incentive contract based on absolute performance. For participants’ altruistic preference that plays a leading role， or participants’ fairness concern that plays a leading role but is small， the firm will choose the incentive contract based on the fixed-price awards.Research results are of practical significance for firms to design and select incentive contract in the crowdsourcing contest.