研究了供应链成员的社会责任（CSR）投入行为对闭环供应链决策的影响。考虑了闭环供应链中以下四种不同的CSR投入方式：（1）无CSR投入；（2）制造商投入CSR；（3）零售商投入CSR；（4）制造商和零售商同时投入CSR。通过对比不同模型的均衡决策和利润，发现制造商和零售商同时进行CSR投入的方式对闭环供应链决策成员和系统均最有利，而零售商投入CSR的方式优于制造商投入CSR方式。其次，以集中化决策模型的最优结果为基准，探讨了不同CSR投入方式下分散化闭环供应链系统的协调机制设计问题。结果表明：两部定价契约能有效实现CSR约束的闭环供应链的协调；且在制造商与零售商同时投入CSR决策情形，契约中制造商的议价能力最弱，零售商的议价能力最强。最后，通过算例分析了模型中关键参数对闭环供应链均衡决策与利润的影响，并进一步对闭环供应链协调的性能进行了分析。
Recently, more and more firms are paying attention to improving corporate social responsibility (CSR). Many researchers have realized this important issue in supply chain management, and further attempt to analyze how to effectively make CSR investment under various decision-making environments. However, few studies have addressed the joint pricing and CSR investment decisions in the closed loop supply chain. On this basis, we aim to fill this research gap by exploring the effect of CSR investment on the optimal decisions and profits in the closed loop supply chain.
Based on observations in the industry, Four following types of CSR investment are considered:(1) No CSR investment:neither of the manufacturernor the retailer makes CSR investment; (2) Manufacturer CSR investment:only the manufacturer makes CSR investment. (3) Retailer CSR investment:only the retailer undertakes the CSR investment activity; and (4) Joint CSR investment:both the manufacturer and the retailer jointly make CSR investment. In the closed loop supply chain, the manufacturer is responsible for collecting the used product. The standard Stakelberg game is used to model the interplay between the manufacturer and the retailer in the closed loop supply chain, the manufacturer is the channel leader and the retailer is the follower. Then, using first-order conditions, the equilibrium prices, equilibrium CSR investment level, equilibrium return rates and the optimal profits are obtained for each channel player and the system under the centralized and the decentralized models. By comparing the equilibrium decisions and profits among different models, it is found that the type of joint CSR investment is optimal for the manufacturer, the retailer and the chain system.In addition, the retailer is the better undertaker of the CSR activity than the manufacturer. However, the result shows that the equilibrium price is the highest under the joint CSR investment case compared with other CSR investment types. Hence, the consumers need to share a larger portion of the CSR investment costs under this case.
The decentralized models have an efficiency loss because of the "double marginalization" effect in the closed loop supply chain. Therefore, how to coordinate the decentralized closed loop supply chains with the CSR constraint is explored. The result shows that the two-part tariff contract can perfectly coordinate the channel under different CSR investment types. By comparing the optimal parameters of the contract, it is found that the manufacturer's bargaining power in the contract is the lowest under the case of joint CSR investment; on the contrary, the retailer's bargaining power is the strongest under this scenario. Finally, a numerical example is used to analyze the impact of some key parameters on equilibrium decisions and explore the effectiveness of the contracts. Our results are helpful for the future research of the closed loop supply chain management. Furthermore, our research also provides certain support for firms in making CSR and collecting decisions, and helps the government to set relevant policies.
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