在"线上下单，线下取货"的BOPS模式下进行了供应链主体的定价与服务合作决策分析。研究发现：1）在零售商主导的结构下，单位补偿契约可以实现合理的利润分配，且向上销售产品的批发价格将不会影响BOPS产品价格、服务决策和最优利润；2）在制造商主导的结构下，批发价格契约可以有效实现服务合作，单位补偿值可影响定价与服务决策继而影响主体间利润分配，且当单位补偿值为0时，供应链总利润最大；3）制造商主导下的供应链效率高于零售商主导下的情形，呈现的双重边际化效应较不明显。研究结论对商家进行全渠道实践提供了参考。
The omni-channel retailing has been a recent trend in retailing industry. Buy-online,pick-up-in-store is one of the most typical patterns and is widely applied in world famous retailers as Uniqlo. This mode brings better service experience to the consumers and more traffic and sales to the brick-and-mortar stores, in the mean time, challenging the extant online and offline operations in pricing and revenue allocation. Thus, how to make the optimal price and service decisions, through what contracts the supply chain is coordinated, and how the leadership structures affect the optimal decisions and profits, are of great significance theoretically and practically.
The price and service decision model is built in centralized, manufacturer-leading and retailer-leading scenarios respectively, using a rebate contract and a wholesale price contract to coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, illustrated examples are used to analyze the decision and profit comparison in different scenarios, and the supply chain efficiency is examined. It is found that:1) in the retailer-leading structure, the rebate contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain, and the wholesale price decided by the manufacturer does not influence price and service level and the final revenue allocation; 2) in the manufacturer-leading structure, the wholesale price contract is effective, and the exogenous rebate influences the decision making and revenue allocation and the supply chain gains the optimal profit if it reached zero; 3) generally, the manufacturer-leading structure performs more effectively than the retailer-leading structure, and the double-marginalization effect is less significant.
The contribution of the paper lies in two parts. First, it is an attempt in building a new price-service decision model in omni-channel research area. Second, it provides insights to the manufacturers and retailers in BOPS implementation considering different leadership structures.
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