基于互联网平台的线上回收商是现有电子废弃物回收体系的有益补充。本文考虑传统分销商和线上回收商之间的回收成本差异以及回收产品的可再制造比例，构建了制造商、分销商和线上回收商之间的Stackelberg博弈定价模型，分别给出了分散决策和集中决策下双渠道的最优回收定价和利润，通过数值仿真分析了可再制造比例、回收竞争系数、消费者回收价格敏感系数等因素对回收价格、回收量和利润的影响。最后，使用收益成本共享契约来实现供应链帕累托改进，并用数值算例来验证协调契约的效率。结果表明：集中决策下整个闭环供应链的利润水平达到最高，分散决策下存在双重边际化的问题而导致效率损失。可再制造比例、回收渠道竞争系数、消费者对回收价格的敏感系数、差异化回收成本与产品回收量、供应链利润呈相关关系。通过设计收益成本共享契约能够有效地改进闭环供应链效率、提高各方利润，且制造商、分销商和线上回收商都有主动实施契约的动力。
Internet-based online recyclers are a useful complement to existing e-waste recycling systems. Considering the differences in the collection cost of dual-channel and remanufacturable ratio of recycling products, the Stackelberg pricing model of manufacturer, retailer and online recycler is established. In this paper, the optimal collection price and profits of dual channel are determined separately under centralized and decentralized decision making. The impact of remanufacturable ratio of recycling products, collection competition coefficient, the consumer sensitivity of collection price and other factors on the collection prices, quantities and profits through numerical simulation is also analysed. Finally, the benefit cost sharing model is used to coordinate the subjects of the supply chain, and numerical examples are used to verify the efficiency of the coordination contract. The results show that:The profit of the whole closed-loop supply chain under the centralized decision making is the largest, whereas double marginalization results in loss of efficiency under decentralized decision making. Remanufacturable ratio of recycling products, collection competition coefficient, the consumer sensitivity of collection price are related to the collection amount of discarded product and profits of supply chain. To design a benefit cost sharing coordination contract can effectively improve the efficiency of closed-loop supply chain and increase profits of each party, and encourage manufacturer, retailer and online recycler to implement the contract.
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