物流外包是零售业全渠道变革与竞争中的关键控制因素，本文针对多个第三方物流企业竞争市场份额，且物流服务水平影响市场需求的情景，研究了零售商的物流外包策略。用MNL模型刻画了零售商的需求分配机制，通过动态博弈得到各参与方的均衡决策及期望收益。研究发现，物流外包引入竞争后物流价格和物流服务水平存在"双降效应"，从而导致零售商在引入竞争决策上的不确定，由此建立了零售商是否引入竞争的核心控制条件。在引入竞争条件下，证明了零售商的双包策略优于多包策略，并给出零售商的最优需求分配方案。
Nowadays the logistics outsourcing is the important factor in the competition and revolution of retailer's omni-channel, facing end customers who are sensitive to both retail price and logistics service, we consider the retailer who outsources the logistics to multiple symmetric TPLs who compete on price and service level. The retailer allocates demand to the TPLs using a MNL (Multinominal Logit Model) choice function while the retailer chooses her price and allocation parameter to maximize his profits. Under symmetric information, a game-theoretic framework is applied to obtain the equilibrium solutions for every entity in single-sourcing, dual-sourcing and multisourcing, the comparison of equilibrium price, service level and retailer's profit in different scenarios was presented. An interesting result shows that both the price and service level of TPLs decrease when the retailer outsources demand to more than one TPL, which makes the retailer difficult to determine the outsourcing strategy. We found that the advantage of single-sourcing versus multisourcing depends on the sensitivity of market demand to retail price and logistics service. For maximized her profits, the retailer prefer to single-sourcing when the sensitivity parameter is high, however, when the sensitivity parameter is low, retailer would rather choose dual-sourcing. Furthermore, we studied the impact of the number of TPLs on the retailer's performance in the competitive setting, we found that while service level decreases as the number of TPLs increases, but the equilibrium logistics price does not change. Overall, the retail's profit is decreasing with the number of TPLs, suggesting that the retailer prefer to dual-source instead of multisourcing. In addition, we considered the problem that the retailer decides how to allocate demands between the TPLs in order to foster competition on both logistics price and service, the optimal parameter of allocation function is given for the dual-sourcing and multisoucing. Finally, the numerical simulation shows the effect that market demand sensitivity and the values which weight the logistics service relative to price have on the retailer's profits. These useful conclusions can provide supports for enterprise managers to make decisions.
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