股权融资已成为成长型企业捕获成长机会的主要手段，但投融资双方矛盾冲突的不断涌现使企业的融资策略显得尤为重要。本文基于供应链的视角构建了零售商的股权融资模型，通过对比分析供应链合作与否时零售商的最优融资决策，探讨零售商在面临良好市场机会时的股权融资策略。核心的发现是：零售商应将企业价值评估和供应链价值创造有效结合，在股权融资过程中重视供应链合作的影响；在供应链合作下零售商的市场成长性主导了股权融资策略选择，但策略选择也受到努力成本参数和价格需求敏感系数的制约。
The PEDATA shows that 33 percent of Chinese enterprises which account for nearly 40 percent of the total market value have adopted equity financing before their IPOs in Chinese stock market. Equity financing has become an important way of capturing the growth opportunity for growth-type enterprises. However, the increasing conflicts between financiers and investors caused by improper financing decisions make the financing strategy very important. Present study considers a risk neutral retailer facing good market opportunity employs equity financing to exploit the market, after which its demand function becomes D=a-bp+βe, where b and e represent its growth and effort, respectively. The financing amount depends on the ordering cost and effort cost, and is used to meet the capital needs of supply chain operation and fixed assets investment. Based on these, an equity financing model is constructed under the supply chain to investigate the retailer's financing strategy by comparing the optimal financing decisions between the case with supply chain cooperation (Stackelberg game between supplier and retailer) and without, the numerical simulation is also present to clearly reveal the financing strategy. Results indicate that the retailer should combine the value evaluation with the value creation and pay more intention to the effect of supply chain cooperation during the financing process. The retailer always prefers equity financing without supply chain cooperation but changes its financing strategy when supply chain cooperation exists. High growth retailer ought to employ equity financing and share the information with its supplier to participate in supply chain cooperation, while medium growth retailer had better adopt equity financing but hides its financing information to avoid supply chain cooperation. However, extremely low growth retailer should not finance itself with equity in case its normal development is constrained. Furthermore, there is a natural contradiction between rapid development (correspond to high growth) and retailer's control, since higher growth retailer always chooses larger financing amount and loses its control more quickly. This problem can be solved by decreasing the financing amount, requiring a higher valuation or adopting the dual class structure to maintain its control. Finally, present study contributes to the exploration of the interaction between operation decision and financing decision, and provides insight into the model research of equity financing from the perspective of supply chain.
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