在外部资本市场不完善的情况下,企业集团内部资本配置是一个十分重要的问题。企业集团内部资本配置,其实质是一种资本转移活动,由于集团内成员企业之间相互联系又相对独立的关系,致使集团内部资本转移活动的动机和结果十分复杂。文章依据演化博弈理论及企业集团内部资本市场基本理论,建立了企业集团内部资本转移激励行为的演化博弈模型,演绎了在内部资本市场资本转移中企业集团总部和集团分部策略选择过程。并通过对企业集团资本转移激励机理的演化博弈分析,建立了企业集团资本转移的有效激励机制。研究表明,如果集团分部的实力较强,具有较强的资本转移能力,单位转移成本获取的资本转移收益更大的情况下,集团总部在制定激励政策时,可以适当提高其资本收益的分配比例,在不影响集团分部资本转移行为积极性的同时,可以获得更多的收益;对于实力较小,资本转移能力较弱的集团分部,集团总部在制定激励政策时可以适当增大其收益的分配比例,增强激励力度,提高集团分部资本转移的积极性。
In the case of imperfect external capital market, capital allocation is a very important problem in the enterprise group. The capital allocation of enterprise groups is a kind of capital transfer activity. Because of the relationship and the relative independence between the members of the group,the motivation and the results of the group's internal capital transfer are very complicated. In this paper based on the view of evolutionary game theory and the basic theory of internal capital markets, an evolutionary game model of Enterprise Groups' incentive behavior is established in internal capital transfers and deductives the strategy selection process in internal capital transfers between Enterprise Group headquarters and Group segment. And through the evolutionary game analysis of Enterprise Group's incentive mechanism in internal capital transfers, an effective governance mechanism is put forward for Enterprise Groups' internal capital transfers. The results show that if the group segment with a strong ability to capital transfers can get more capital transfer income per unit of capital transfer costs,the group headquarters in the formulation of incentive policies, can appropriately increase the proportion of capital gains. In the same time, the group headquarters get more benefits while not affecting the group segment capital transfer behavior. On the contrary, for the smaller group segment, the group headquarters in the formulation of incentive policies can be appropriate to increase the proportion of their income distribution, enhance the incentive, improve the enthusiasm of the group's capital transfer.
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