2014年以来我国几乎所有银行都发行了可减记的二级资本债，直观上这一新型或有资本显著提高了薪酬结构为固定工资加股权激励的管理者的冒险动机。为此，本文提出在管理者薪酬结构中引入或有现金收入的新举措，分析了二级资本债和或有现金薪酬对管理者冒险动机、公司价值以及破产概率的影响。利用风险中性定价方法给出了二级资本债和管理者薪酬定价的显式解。数量分析表明：发行二级资本债可以通过减少破产概率而增加公司价值，但同时显著提高了管理者的冒险动机。而或有现金薪酬设计有效抑制了这一动机。不仅银行股东可以选择管理者或有现金收入和股权激励来调节管理者的冒险动机，而且银行监管机构可以通过调节减记触发水平来控制银行系统风险。
Most of domestic banks have issued Write-down Contingent Capital Bonds (write-down CoCo bonds). Intuitively, such a new contingent capital must induce a considerable adventure motivation of managers under the fixed wage and equity incentive compensation structure. To mitigate and even completely eliminate this incentive, contingent cash compensation is taken as a manager's long-term incentive fee and a new scheme of managerial contingent compensation is established. The effects of write-down CoCo bonds issuance and managerial contingent compensation design on managers' risk-taking motivation are studied. The value of the issuing company, the ruin probability, bankruptcy cost, and the risk premium of the common bond. Closed-form solutions of the values of the write-down CoCo bonds and managerial wealth are obtained under a risk-neutral probability measure. By numerical simulations, it is found that write-down CoCo bonds increase the value of the issuing company by reducing their bankruptcy probability, but enhance the managers' adventure motivation. In contrast, the managerial contingent cash income can restrain this motive. In addition, shareholders of the issuing company can adjust the amount of contingent cash compensation or the fraction of equity to control the adventure motivation of managers and in particular, regulators are able to control the risk of the banking system by adjusting the trigger level to write down. Therefore, our analysis has theoretical and practical guiding significance for risk management problems of the issuer and bank regulators, and it is helpful to the current reform in the financial institution compensation of managers.
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