本文结合中国转型经济的制度背景，利用2007-2014年中国深市中小板民营上市公司的数据，以超额招待差旅费作为企业腐败支出的替代变量，实证考察了民营企业腐败活动对其研发投入的影响。研究结果表明：对于进行研发活动的民营企业，其腐败支出与研发投入强度呈倒U型关系；进一步研究发现，民营企业腐败支出与研发投入之间的关系会随着企业规模及其所在地制度环境的变化而表现出显著差异。上述结果不仅完善了非正式机制对中国民营企业研发投资影响的研究，也为当前反腐败和促进企业创新的政策制定提供了一定的启示作用。
Numerous researches indicate that the innovation efficiency and activity of private enterprises are well above state-owned ones. Nevertheless, private enterprises are facing many institutional obstacles during technological innovation researches, such as lacking safeguard mechanism of innovative revenue, e.g. R&D funds scarcity and deficiency on IPR protection system. Hence, some private enterprises might establish political relationships with the government officer for gaining research resources and protecting R&D achievements. However, the high corruption expenditure on such relationship could also reduces the marginal productivity of innovation activities and entrepreneurship rewards, thereby restraining the R&D investment. Consequently, in this paper. focus is mainly put on two research gaps:firstly, what impact the private enterprises' corruption activities (as an alternative mechanism for formal institution) has on their R&D investment under the economic transition environment of China? Secondly, is there any different impact during the change of company size and local institutional environment? Primarily, anin-depth theoretical analysis for above thesis has been made in this paper in the context of economic institutional transition in China. Afterwards, by means of establishing excess entertainment & travel expenditure model of private enterprises, the excess entertainment & travel expenditure is taken as alternative variable to represent corporate corruption expenses. Data of Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed SMEs' from 2007 to 2014 is collected and regression methods including OLS, 2SLS and Logit are used to implement empirical analysis on above research thesis. The final results from this study indicate that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption expenditure and R&D investment intensity of private enterprises. Moreover, such a relationship varies in the change of company size and local institutional environment. This study has also enriched research about the influence of informal mechanisms on R&D investment of private enterprises and provided inspirations for establishing anti-corruption and enterprises' innovative promotion policies.
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