生物质燃料收集难是制约生物质发电产业发展的主要因素之一,生物质燃料供给模式对生物质发电产业的发展有着重要作用。本文建立传统模式下经济效益最大化的农户、经济组织、电厂三者的动态博弈模型;并引入基金组织,即村委会组织农户收集燃料,销售收入部分归农户,部分用于村基础设施建设,构建考虑效用最大化的农户、基金组织、电厂三方的博弈模型。结果表明,农户生物质燃料供给量、组织提供给农户的价格同上网电价呈正相关关系,同燃料的运输、存储及预处理成本呈负相关关系。另外,基金组织模式下,效用函数系数对生物质燃料供给量和基金组织给农户的经济利益有一定影响。对两模式进行比较发现,基金组织模式下,农户的生物质燃料供给量和收益均高于传统模式。政府实施激励后农户的效用、组织的效用、电厂的经济利益均增加。
It is very difficult to collect biofuel, which is a main constraint of developing the biomass generation industry. Biofuel collecting mode plays a significant role in promoting the biomass power industry. In this paper, two dynamic game theory models are built: (1) Optimizing the economic benefits of farmer, economic organization and biomass power plant under tradition mode; (2) maximizing the utilities of these three parties with introduction of foundation organization, i.e. the village committee organizes the farmers to collect the biomass feedstock, part of whose revenue belongs to the farmers and the rest is utilized for the village's infrastructure construction. The income is divided to two parts; one owes to farmers, the other is used for building infrastructure. The results demonstrate that the supply amount of biomass fuels and the price offered by organizations to the peasants have positive correlation relationship with feed-in tariff, while negative correlation with the cost of biomass fuels transportation, storage, and preprocess. Moreover, in the mode of foundation organization, the coefficient of the utility function has impact to some extent on the supply amount of biomass fuels and the benefit to peasants delivered by foundation. The biomass fuels supply amount and the peasant's income in the foundation organization mode are higher than those in the tradition mode. With the incentives from government, the utilities of the farmer and organization present significant, as well as the economic benefit of biomass power plant,increase.
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