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论文

隐藏招标人偏好的政府工程多属性招投标分析

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  • 1. 重庆邮电大学经济管理学院, 重庆 400065;
    2. 西南政法大学管理学院, 重庆 401120

收稿日期: 2014-08-19

  修回日期: 2015-04-14

  网络出版日期: 2016-08-24

基金资助

国家社会科学基金资助项目(16XGL004);重庆邮电大学经济管理学院博士启动基金项目(K2014-02)

A Research on Multi-attribute Bidding Game of Government Projects when Tenderee's Preference is Hidden

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  • 1. School of Economy and Management, Chongqing University of Communications and Posts, Chongqing 400065, China;
    2. School of Management, Southwest University of Political and law, Chongqing 401120, China

Received date: 2014-08-19

  Revised date: 2015-04-14

  Online published: 2016-08-24

摘要

采用Harsanyi引入虚拟局中人的方法,将隐藏招标人偏好的政府工程多属性不完全博弈转换为一个完全但不完美信息博弈,在求出博弈模型的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡解的基础上,分析招、投标双方的博弈策略。结果发现:投标人是否参与隐藏招标人偏好的政府工程投标,取决于其对招标人偏好的判断,其预期招标人的质量和工期偏好系数的概率值越大,期望收益就越大,投标积极性越高;招标人的招标剩余效用以及投标人的收益与投标质量和工期呈U形关系;招标人可以有意识地释放其偏好信息,以刺激投标人从而增加招标的剩余效用。这些结论的应用有助于改进政府工程招标程序设计,规范政府工程招投标行为。

本文引用格式

何建洪, 吕炜 . 隐藏招标人偏好的政府工程多属性招投标分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016 , 24(8) : 164 -171 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.08.020

Abstract

In China, the Law of Bidding has come into operation for about fifteen years, which helped to increase the efficiency of the government construction projects. The law not only played an important role in improving the quality and reducing the cost of the government construction projects, but also ensured that the projects were completed on schedule. However, there are still many problems left to be resolved. For instance, the tenderee may set some unnecessary conditions in bidding for government projects so that the specified tenderer can win the bidding easily. Even on some occasions, the tenderer who bought off agents and judges final won the bidding. So the bidding for government construction projects has been criticized for years. Some more efficient and fairer bidding institutions have to be found to prevent public interest of government projects.According to Harsanyi's method of introduction a suppositional player, the incomplete Game of multi-attribute bidding of government projects is transformed to a complete but imperfect information game in which tenderee's preference is hidden, and then perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the bidding strategy of the tender and tenderee are given. The results show that there is "U" shaped relationship between the tenderee's remaining utility or benefit and the tender's commitment to quality and duration. The same relation exists between the tenderer's benefit and its commitment to quality and duration. This means that (1) if the tender will be able to take appropriate measures to keep their own preference hided, and the tenderer can ensure the commitment quality and duration to reach a certain level, the tenderer will make the greatest efforts to improve their quality and the duration, in order to increase the probability of winning; (2) if the tenderer's quality and duration of construction projects meet the certain requirement (ie. the lowest point of the "U" curve), its optimal strategy will ensure the tenderee acquire the best offer and the largest remaining utility; (3) in this case, the tenderers will form a prospective that the tenderer would set a high level requirement of quality and duration, and then their motivations to rent-seeking and complot will extremely decline.In addition, it is also found that when thetenderee hide its preference for quality and duration, the tender will do its best to improve their offer as possible, which will improve the efficiency of government projects. So government needs to develop s strict confidentiality procedures and rules to prevent the behaviors of the tenderer, tenderee and agent.

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