为研究非强制性再保情况下，中小企业信用再担保体系稳定发展应具备的条件，本文建立中小企业信用担保与再担保机构行为策略的演化博弈模型，利用微分方程稳定性原理求解演化稳定策略，并确定再担保体系稳定发展所需的条件；以此为基础，在保证再担保体系稳定发展的前提下，定量描述了担保和再担保机构之间的风险分担比例、再担保保费、最低政府风险补贴要求等再担保运营机制具有的可调节范围；最后，结合算例进行验证和应用分析。研究发现：1）若担保机构加入再担保体系后，同时满足再担保机构增加的收益为正、担保机构增加的收益大于申请成本，则可保证再担保体系稳定发展；2）代偿率对再担保运营机制的可调节范围有重要影响，代偿率越高，风险分担比例、再担保保费具有的可调节空间越小，若随代偿率上升不存在调节空间时，需要政府对担保、再担保机构进行适当的风险补贴，以保证再担保体系稳定发展。这些研究结果为我国中小企业信用再担保的实践提供了理论参考。
In countries with stable small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) credit re-guarantee system, SMEs credit guarantee companies are required to join the re-guarantee system, and every SMEs credit guarantee agreement is automatically guaranteed by re-guarantee company. However, SMEs credit re-guarantee system is not mandatory in China. An important question is what conditions shall be matched in order to form a stable SMEs credit re-guarantee system through market mechanism rather than compulsory means. To answer the question, an evolutionary game model between SMEs credit guarantee companies and re-guarantee companies was developed to explore the evolutionary stability conditions for SMEs credit re-guarantee system. The evolutionary stable strategies and corresponding conditions of the system were found by utilizing the stability theory of differential equations. Under the premise of steady development of the system, adjustable ranges of operating mechanisms in the re-guarantee system, such as risk sharing proportion, re-guarantee rate and minimum government subsidy, were also further discussed quantitatively. Lastly, a numerical example was provided to verify and applicate the conclusions. The results show that the stable development of SMEs credit re-guarantee system needs two conditions:the incremental payoff of re-guarantee companies has to be positive, and the incremental payoff of guarantee companies has to exceed the filing costs after SMEs credit guarantee companies joining in the SMEs credit re-guarantee system. The results also show that the compensation rate has significant influences on the operating mechanisms in the re-guarantee system. The greater the compensation rate, the lesser the adjustable range of risk sharing proportion and re-guarantee rate. Moderate government subsidy is needed if the adjustable range of risk sharing proportion and re-guarantee rate is absent. The research results provide theoretical references that can be used to improve China's SMEs credit re-guarantee system.
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