2007年证监会和银监会联合发布《120号通知》要求强制披露上市公司对外担保实施以来,详细查阅上市公司信息披露公告获知,2007至2014年间超过40%的上市公司存在对外担保业务;提供担保公司的资产负债率均值54.07%、资产收益率均值为3.07%,未提供担保公司的资产负债率均值43%、资产收益率均值4.5%,揭示担保公司财务特征对担保行为选择具有一定影响。为深入诠释该现象,本文基于"担保价格不仅取决于担保是否给公司带来正净现金流,而且取决于提供担保后所有者权益占公司比例的变化程度"的理性担保方定价策略,构建担保供需理论模型,逻辑推理给出研究假设。利用2007至2014中国A股主板非金融类上市公司的样本进行检验发现:(1)提供担保公司数量先随公司所有者权益占资产总额比重的增加而增加,但当超过某一阈值后随公司所有者权益比重的增加而减少,特别资产负债率影响对外担保行为由增到减拐点的阈值:国有上市公司在80%左右,非国有公司在70%左右。(2)提供担保公司数量先随公司盈利能力增强而增加,但超过某一阈值后随公司盈利能力增强而减少,特别公司盈利能力影响对外担保行为由增到减拐点的阈值:国有上市公司在11%左右,非国有公司在13%左右;给出国有上市公司由于政府的隐性担保带来的资信福利,导致国有上市公司在同等条件下,资信水平较非国有公司高估,导致担保契约增加拐点和担保契约减少拐点都比非国有公司财务状况要差。
After the implementation of No.120 announcement issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission and China Banking Regulatory Commission, according to our survey, from 2007 to 2014, over 40% of the list firms provide loan guarantees to a third party; and the average leverage and return on asset (ROA) of those firms which provide loan guarantees to third party is 54.07% and 3.07% separately. Compared with that, the average leverage and return on asset (ROA) of firms without the provision of loan guarantees is 43% and 4.5% separately. The large difference in financial characteristics between firms with and without loan guarantee indicates that the financial characteristics may affect the provision of loan guarantees. To interpret this phenomenon, a theoretical model is built based on the rational pricing policy: (1) a guarantee contract must has positive net cash flow, and (2) a guarantee contract must not change the ration of equity and debt. And then using the sample from Chinese stock exchange from year 2007 to 2014, it is found that (1) at beginning, the provision of loan guarantee positively related to the leverage of guarantor and the performance of guarantor. But these relation turn to the opposite side after a threshold value. (2) The threshold values of leverage and performance are different between state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies. At the threshold values, non-state-owned companies showed lower leverage and better performance. These results indicate that because of the implicate guarantee of government, even with the same financial characteristic, state-owned companies have better credit score than non-stated-owned companies.
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