再制造企业出租二手产品并在租赁期间向用户提供配套服务,企业提供优质服务的努力和用户精心使用产品的努力既会影响到使用期间的服务数量和成本,也会影响到退租产品的质量和使用寿命,进而影响企业的再制造成本和环境效益。本文研究双方努力程度对于再制造下租赁产品服务系统绩效的影响,引入企业对用户的转移支付作为调节因素,讨论基于服务节约收益共享机制下的最优努力程度与收益函数之间的性质关系。研究表明当回收产品关于再制造企业和产品用户努力程度的边际价值大于其付出努力的边际成本且服务节约转移支付的激励效果有限时,系统可以实现协调并且渠道总收益要优于传统固定服务收费的情形。进一步数量仿真发现:服务需求量和渠道总收益具有相同的变化趋势,增加服务量不会减少渠道收益;并且服务节约转移支付与再制造企业的努力程度成反比,与产品用户努力程度成正比。此外在不具有成本优势的条件下,再制造企业付出努力的意愿程度也更高。
When a remanufacturing enterprise leases the second-hand product and provides relative service to the user, the efforts of quality service for the enterprise and the efforts of elaborate operations for the user will undoubtedly affect the service quantity and costs as well as the quality and lifetime of the returned products, thus the remanufacturing costs and environment benefits. In this paper, the degree of both efforts influencing the performance of the leased product service system is studied based on remanufacturing, introducing a transfer payment from enterprise to user as a moderator, discussing the relationship between equilibrium effort levels and revenue function of the channel based on shared-saving contracts. It's found that when the marginal value of taking-back used product over the remanufacturing enterprise's and user's efforts is respectively greater than the marginal cost over the efforts and the transfer payment of per service savings has limited incentive effect, the system can achieve coordination and the total channel profit is greater than the fixed service price contract. Furthermore, a detailed numerical simulation finds that service demand and channel profit have the same trends with the transfer payments and additional service will not decrease the channel profit. The transfer payment of per service savings is in inverse ratio to the efforts of remanufacturing enterprise, in direct ratio to the efforts of product user. In different level of cost the enterprises have the willingness to give corresponding efforts, but when they have no cost advantages the willingness of remanufacturing enterprise will be higher and so is the environmental value.
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