文章以一个制造商和一个供应商所构成的两级供应链为研究对象,应用微分博弈的方法分析了四种不同的质量管理博弈情形下,制造商和供应商的最优质量管理策略、收益和整条供应链的总收益。研究结果表明,当制造商和供应商的收益分配比满足一定条件时,从Nash非合作质量管理博弈情形,到弱激励Stackelberg博弈情形,再到强激励Stackelberg博弈情形,最后到合作质量管理博弈情形,对于制造商、供应商以及整个供应链系统来说都是一种帕累托改进。所以,合作质量管理博弈情形是供应链质量管理所追求的最理想的情形,为了有效促进该情形的实现,文章应用Nash讨价还价模型对该情形下合作双方关于供应链系统的剩余利润分配进行了分析。最后,在对一家电风扇制造商的供应链进行调查来获得仿真数据的基础上,通过算例分析验证了理论推导的结果。
With the two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single supplier as its research object, the manufacturer and the supplier's optimal quality management strategy, revenue and the total revenue of the entire supply chain in four different game situations are anylyzed. The results showed that when the income distribution between the manufacturer and the supplier met certain conditions, it was a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer, the supplier and the whole supply chain system from quality management Nash non-cooperative game situation, to weak incentive Stackelberg game situation, to the strong incentive Stackelberg game situation, and finally to the cooperation quality management game situation. Therefore, the cooperation quality management game situation was the ideal situation during the process of supply chain quality management. In order to promote the realization of the situation effectively, Nash bargaining model was applied to analyze the allocation of the remaining profits in the supply chain system between the parties. Finally, based on the simulation data got from the survey on the supply chain of an electric fan manufacturer, a numerical example was given to verify the results of the theoretical derivation.
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