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论文

供应链式产业集群技术创新博弈分析

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  • 福州大学经济与管理学院, 福建 福州 350116

收稿日期: 2014-06-23

  修回日期: 2014-10-23

  网络出版日期: 2016-01-28

基金资助

国家自然科学基金资助项目(70973022,71403052,71403055);高等学校博士学科点科研基金(20123514110011);国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(15FGL005);福建省软科学项目(2015R0002);福建省高校新世纪优秀人才计划项目(闽教科2015[54]号);中国博士后科学基金(2015M570155)

A Game Analysis on the Technology Innovation of Chain-style Industrial Cluster

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  • School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116, China

Received date: 2014-06-23

  Revised date: 2014-10-23

  Online published: 2016-01-28

摘要

供应链式产业集群具备集群和供应链特性,这类集群的技术创新活动存在两种类型:供应链上下游企业创新活动和供应链间企业创新活动。从技术创新视角出发,将集群创新过程分成研发阶段和产出阶段,并引入技术溢出系数、研发资金、技术创新成功概率等变量,用动态博弈方法分别对供应链上下游企业及供应链间企业的技术创新进行分析,推导出企业利润均衡函数,最后得出如下结论:①供应链上下游企业不创新或同时创新的情况下,双方将共享利润;②由于存在技术溢出现象,供应链内某一企业进行创新,该企业及其上下游企业利润都将提高;③供应链内上下游企业采取合作创新的利润大于未创新和独立创新情况下的利润;④供应链核心企业间的竞争激烈,链间技术溢出程度变小,不创新的企业市场份额将降低,利润减少。

本文引用格式

王丽丽, 陈国宏 . 供应链式产业集群技术创新博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016 , 24(1) : 151 -158 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.01.018

Abstract

Chain-style industrial cluster has characteristics of cluster and supply chain, so technology innovation activities of enterprises happen inside and outside the supply chain. From the perspective of technological innovation, the process of cluster's innovation activity was divided into the R&D stage and the output stage, and the coefficients of technology spillover, R&D funds, and technological innovation success probability were put in the game model. Then, dynamic game method was applied to analyze the enterprise's technological innovation inside and outside the supply chain for deducing the enterprises' profit equilibrium function. Finally, the following conclusions:(1)In the supply chain, when whatever upstream and downstream enterprises innovate or not innovate, both of them will share the profits.(2)Due to the presence of technology overflow phenomenon in the supply chain, when some enterprises innovate, they and their upstream and downstream enterprises will increase profits.(3)In the supply chain, the profits of upstream and downstream enterprises who had innovated cooperatively are more than the ones who were out of innovation or innovation independently.(4)With the core enterprises of the supply chain competing more, the degree of technology spillover will be smaller, the market share of enterprises who had not innovated will decline, and the profit of them will reduce.

参考文献

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