基于Baron为代表的战略CSR观点和一条由上游制造商和下游零售商构成的两级供应链,用制造商和零售商是否被要求实施CSR行为来描述供应链中的CSR配置,分别建立求解了三种CSR配置下的三阶段非合作运作模型。相应的均衡社会业绩和经济业绩之间的比较结果表明,在消费者对供应链中的CSR行为具有积极反应的条件下,由于制造商和零售商的CSR行为之间的策略性互补性导致的相互激励机制,使得“制造商和零售商各自为自己的CSR行为负责”这一CSR配置获得的经济业绩和社会业绩均较高。进一步,合作运作下的Nash讨价还价解显示,由于合作的运作方式可以克服非合作运作中存在于产品交易阶段的双重加价的问题和CSR策略性行为互动阶段的CSR行为动机不足问题,从而可以进一步提高社会业绩和经济业绩。这些结果一方面为解决"哪个节点企业应当对供应链整体的社会责任行为负责"这一争议提供了一个理论回应;另一方面,指出供应链中的CSR行为的管理,重点不是CSR在供应链中如何配置,而在于是否采用合作的运作方式。
Based on Baron's strategic CSR view, this paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, and models three different CSR allocations by examining whether the manufacturer or the retailer is required to conduct CSR activities. Further, three-stage non-cooperative operations models are built corresponding to three different CSR allocations in the supply chain (the retailer alone is responsible for CSR activities, the manufacture alone is responsible for CSR activities, both are responsible for CSR activities)so as to identify the mutual incentive mechanism between supply chain members. The comparisons among the equilibrium economic and social performances under those three different CSR allocations show that under the condition that consumers positively respond to supply chain CSR activites, supply chain members' CSR choices are strategically complementary, leading to mutual incentives on their CSR behaviors, and due to this mutual incentive, the CSR allocation where both the manufacturer and the retailer are responsible for their own CSR activities reuslts in higher economic and social performance in equilibrium. Furthermore, A Nash bargaining model is used to describe cooperative CSR decision making and wholesale price contract negotiation. The corresponding Nash bargaining solution shows that since this cooperative operations can overcome the problem of double marginalization in the ex post product-transaction stage and the lack of CSR motivation (relative to the CSR motivations in centralized case)in the ex ante CSR strategic interaction stage (due to the strategic complementarity)under non-cooperative operations, the cooperation can further enhance both supply chain members' individual and the supply chain's social and economic performances(compared to the highest performance outcome under non-cooperative operations where both members are responsible). The main results obtained in both a non-cooperative and a cooperative settings are numerically illustrated. These results, on the one hand, provide a theoretical response to the debate on which member in a supply chain should be responsible for CSR activities, and on the other hand, point out that the focus in managing CSR interactions in a supply chain shall not be on how allocate CSR among supply chain members, but on whether to adopt a cooperative way to operate the supply chain.
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