本文利用实物期权方法对授权决策的核心问题——授权时机和授权对象的选择——进行了研究。首先分析了授权决策的期权特征,对授权决策中存在的实物期权进行了总结;然后构建了授权决策的实物期权模型,分别计算出了授权决策的期权价值和授权时员工对公司的人力资本价值,由此得出了一个可比性的授权决策标准,即临界业绩水平,从而简化了决策指标,提高了信息的利用率,使企业可以对特质各异的候选人进行准确比较,并分三种授权决策情形分别给出了决策方案,最后基于数值算例作出了进一步的解析。
Delegation, including promotion, is an important strategic decision in organizations. It is not only an incentive for individual behavior, and what's more it is selecting the new masters for the organization's future. The fundamental accordance to delegation decision-making is the expectation of the performance that the candidate can create in the future. On account of uncertainties associating with performance all along, options are valuable in face of uncertainty according to real option theory, so the delegation decision-making is to make the most valuable choice in a series of opportunities. The real option characteristics are analyzed and the options in delegation decision-making are summarized, then the two core problems of delegation decision-making are studied, when and to whom to delegate, with real options theory. It firstly constructed a real option model and calculated the real option value of delegation and the employee's human capital value to the company by the time of delegation. Thereby, the model educed a comparable criterion for delegation decision-making, namely critical performance. It is possible to compare the candidates with different characteristics by the criterion. Then the decision schemes for three delegation conditions are discussed respectively: with both rights to choose when and to whom to delegate; with the right to choose when and with no right to choose to whom to delegate, that is to say the candidate is unique; with the right to choose to whom and with no right to choose when to delegate, namely no ideal candidate is available in a given period of time. The fundamental motivation and basis of delegation decision-making is performance: the expectation for good performance in the future is motivation, in accordance with the past performance (or experience). What counts is how to use the past performance or experience to provide information to judge the future performance. Delegation decision-making based on real option theory extracts only two parameters, the growth parameters α and the proportion variance parameters σ, from the candidate's past performance or experience, which not only simplifies the rules, but also improves the information utilization,so the different candidates' Competencies can be compared effectively to administer the considering project.
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