减排成本的存在,导致低碳产品的零售价格偏高,市场需求偏低,从而制约低碳产品的推广。以此为背景,针对单一制造商和单一零售商构成的双边垄断供应链,建立了基于减排成本分担契约的Stackelberg模型,分析比较了有、无减排成本分担契约两种情况下订货量、供应链各成员利润及供应链整体利润变化。研究发现,引入减排成本分担契约后,低碳产品最优订货量增加,零售价格降低,且在一定条件下制造商和零售商的利润得到帕累托改进,并推导出了制造商和零售商的参与约束和最优分担率。在此基础上,进一步分析了消费者对低碳产品的认知与零售商的产品订货量、供应链整体利润呈正相关关系,与制造商承担的减排成本分担率呈负相关关系。最后结合数值分析验证了成本分担契约的有效性。
For the existence of carbon emission reduction cost, the retail price of the products is so high that the market demand is low, which restricts the promotion of low-carbon products. Our motivation comes from the fact that most consumers think that the price of low-carbon products is so high that they are not willing to buy. So, how to reduce the price of low-carbon products so that the demand can be improved has become an important issue in enterprise operation. On the background of a bilateral-monopoly supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, Stackelberg models are established based on the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract. And the backward induction is regarded as an efficient method of solving the problem. We analyze how the order quantity, the profits of supply chain members and the whole supply chain are influenced by the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract within the supply chain. According to the research, when the carbon emission reduction cost -sharing contract is introduced into the model, it leads a good consequence that the optimal order quantity of the low-carbon product increases, the retail price decreases, and the manufacturer and the retailer will get Pareto improvement on certain condition. On the basis, a further analysis is carried on and a conclusion shows that consumers' awareness and emotional factors of low-carbon products have a positive effect on enterprise's order quantity and profit, while have a negative effect on the optimal cost-sharing rate shared by the manufacture. Our key contribution lies in modeling the cost-sharing contract to coordinate the relationship between the manufacturer and retailer. At the same time, the supply chain member can get Pareto improvement on certain condition.
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