母子公司治理是企业集团治理的核心问题,集团内母子公司相互联系又相对独立的关系产生了新的治理问题,成为影响企业集团发挥整体优势的难题。本文运用演化博弈分析模型,充分考虑治理的动态性及子公司能动性对治理的影响,研究企业集团治理中母公司对子公司监督策略选择与子公司策略选择的互动机制,并对影响该系统演化过程稳定的重要因素进行分析,为解决企业集团母子公司间委托代理问题提供一种新的思路。研究结果表明博弈过程在3种情况下存在演化稳定策略,而不存在最优的稳定策略。通过设计合理的激励机制,如在对子公司的激励中引入提成比与子公司为集团创造收益正相关的业绩提成报酬、增加处罚力度、采取定期或不定期抽查等方式,可影响母子公司策略选择的调整速度,使博弈向(集团利益最大化、不监督)的策略演化,促进母子公司之间建立起一种互信互利的良好关系,增加集团整体收益,发挥企业集团的整体优势。

With the development of information & knowledge economy and the deepening of economic globalization, Chinese businesses are facing increasingly competitive pressure from the world. Construction of large enterprise groups is becoming a trend. At the same time, with the increase of mergers and acquisitions, and the further expansion of multinational corporations, governance problem brought by the complexity of the enterprise groups is urgent to be solved. Corporate governance should span a single corporate governance boundary, to expand enterprise dimensions, implementation from "Corporate "governance to "group" governance breakthrough.Parent-subsidiary corporate governance is the core issue of corporate governance, parent companies and subsidiaries within the group interconnected and relatively independent relationship has produced a new governance issue, become a problem that influence enterprise groups to exert the overall advantages. In this paper, by using evolutionary game analysis model, and fully considering the dynamic nature of governance and its subsidiary initiative on governance, the mechanism of interaction between supervision strategy of the subsidiary to the parent company and the strategy selection strategy of subsidiary is studied, and the important factors affecting the evolution stability of the system were analyzed.The corporate governance theory is enriched, and a new idea to solve the principal-agent problem between the parent and subsidiary is offered.The results show that the process of the game existed evolutionary stable strategy in 3 cases, but there is no optimal stable strategy. The strategy choices depend on each other's strategy selection probability, the final equilibrium state depends on the parent company learning adjustment speed. Through the design of a reasonable incentive mechanism, such as the introduction of the percentage ratio α that positively related to the income created by the subsidiaries of the group, to increase penalties, take regular or irregular spot checks and other means, the parent-subsidiary company strategy adjustment speed can be affected, the game will turn to the strategy evolution evolution that group profit is the biggest change, or that there is no supervision.And a good relations of mutual trust and benefit between parent company and subsidiary is promoted, the group overall income is increased, the overall superiority of enterprise groups will be strengthen.