私募基金市场融资缺口的形成机理与解决路径研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1619

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (7): 91-102.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1619

私募基金市场融资缺口的形成机理与解决路径研究

倪宣明¹, 邱语宁¹, 赵慧敏²

1.北京大学软件与微电子学院，北京100871； 2.中山大学管理学院，广东广州510275

收稿日期:2021-08-16 修回日期:2021-11-29 出版日期:2023-07-17 发布日期:2023-07-17
通讯作者: 赵慧敏(1977-)，女(汉族)，河南驻马店人，中山大学管理学院,副教授，博士，研究方向：资产定价，Email：zhaohuim@mail.sysu.edu.cn. E-mail:zhaohuim@mail.sysu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71991474）；广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2022A1515011893)；国家自然科学基金面上项目(71973147)

The Mechanism and Solution of Equity Gap in Private Equity Market

NI Xuan-ming¹, QIU Yu-ning¹, ZHAO Hui-min²

1. School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University，Beijing 100871, China；2. School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

Received:2021-08-16 Revised:2021-11-29 Online:2023-07-17 Published:2023-07-17
Contact: 赵慧敏 E-mail:zhaohuim@mail.sysu.edu.cn

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 融资缺口一直是私募基金市场发展中无法忽视的实践问题。本文从合作博弈角度，基于Shapley值这一分配方式，构建模型对融资缺口的形成机理进行刻画并探讨相应的解决路径。研究发现，货币资本供给不足、目标企业需求不足以及配置低效是融资缺口的三大成因，供给不足具体表现为LP投资意愿较低，需求不足源于市场高质量企业数量少，配置低效则是GP能力不足所导致的供给需求不匹配。进一步地，本文给出了融资缺口成因的判别方法，针对不同成因，政府可以通过政府引导基金增加供给、税收优惠推动企业高质量发展、增强信息披露以提高GP识别能力等直接或间接手段，有效弥补市场融资缺口。推动企业高质量发展虽然是个缓慢的过程，但是有助于实现资本市场和企业发展的良性循环，促使科技成为经济发展的动力源泉。

关键词: 融资缺口；私募基金；合作博弈；Shapley值

Abstract: Equity gap has always been a practical problem that can not be ignored in the development of private fund market. From the perspective of cooperative game, a model based on Shapley value is constructed, to describe the formation of equity gap and explore the corresponding solutions. It is found that insufficient money supply, insufficient demand of target enterprises and inefficient allocation are the three main reasons for the formation of equity gap. Insufficient supply means that the investment willingness of LP is low, insufficient demand means that the market is lack of high-quality enterprises, and inefficient allocation is manifested in the mismatch between supply and demand caused by GP. Meanwhile, a method is given to distinguish the causes of equity gap. For different causes, the government can effectively make up for the equity gap by direct or indirect means, such as introducing government-sponsored venture capital, promoting the development of enterprises through tax incentives, and enhancing information disclosure to improve GP’s recognition ability. Although promoting the quality of enterprises is a slow process, it helps to realize the virtuous circle of capital market and enterprise development, and make technology be the source of economic growth.

Key words: equity gap; private equity; cooperative game; Shapley value

中图分类号:

F062.5

倪宣明, 邱语宁, 赵慧敏. 私募基金市场融资缺口的形成机理与解决路径研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(7): 91-102.

NI Xuan-ming, QIU Yu-ning, ZHAO Hui-min. The Mechanism and Solution of Equity Gap in Private Equity Market[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(7): 91-102.

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私募基金市场融资缺口的形成机理与解决路径研究

The Mechanism and Solution of Equity Gap in Private Equity Market

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