混合所有制改革背景下的国有企业所有权结构选择：基于公益性职能的视角

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2349

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 所有权结构选择是国有企业混合所有制改革面临的首要问题。本文首先构建数学模型从理论上揭示混合所有制改革背景下国有企业公益性职能与所有权结构之间的内在关系，然后选取2010-2018年期间的国有上市公司样本对国有企业公益性职能与所有权结构之间的关系进行实证检验。研究结果表明，在保持国有属性不变的条件下，低公益性国有企业应该引入不实质性参与公司治理的非国资大股东和中小股东参与混合所有制改革，承担较高公益性职能的国有企业应该选择国资股东、实质性参与公司治理的非国资大股东和中小股东共同持股的均衡所有权结构，具有很高公益性职能的国有企业应该国有独资经营。本文研究结果为国有企业混合所有制改革过程中的所有权结构选择和优化提供了理论依据和实践证据。

关键词: 所有权结构；公益性职能；国有企业；混合所有制改革

Abstract: The choice of ownership structure is the primary issue in the mixed ownership reform of SOEs in China. It is the basic duty and legal obligation of SOEs to perform public welfare functions. The SOEs with different levels of public welfare function need to choose different ownership structures due to the different public welfare functions they need to perform. The level of public welfare function should be the fundamental basis for the SOEs to choose the ownership structure in the mixed ownership reform. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the ownership structure choice mechanism of SOEs performing different public welfare functions from both theoretical and empirical levels, so as to strengthen the match between the public welfare functions and ownership structure of SOEs, smoothly promote the mixed ownership reform of SOEs, and ensure the sustainable, stable and healthy development of SOEs.

Key words: ownership structure； public welfare functions； SOEs； mixed ownership reform

中图分类号:

陈其安, 张国宏, 赵旭. 混合所有制改革背景下的国有企业所有权结构选择：基于公益性职能的视角[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(7): 38-49.

CHEN Qi-an, ZHANG Guo-hong, ZHAO Xu. The Choice on Ownership Structure of SOEs under the Background of Mixed Ownership Reform：Based on the Prospective of Public Welfare Functions[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(7): 38-49.

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