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中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (11): 333-342.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0835

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑确权可信能力的知识产权管理平台确权渠道策略研究

张海强1, 杜荣1, 艾时钟1, 裴庆祺2, 马立川3   

  1. 1.西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,陕西 西安710071;2.陕西省区块链与安全计算重点实验室,陕西 西安710071;3.西安电子科技大学 综合业务网理论及关键技术国家重点实验室,陕西 西安710071
  • 收稿日期:2020-05-09 修回日期:2020-08-24 出版日期:2022-11-20 发布日期:2022-11-28
  • 通讯作者: 杜荣(1968-),女(汉族),陕西咸阳人,西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,硕/博士生导师,教授,研究方向:知识管理理论与方法、IT服务管理与行为决策、跨文化管理与互联网商务分析,Email:durong@mail.xidian.edu.cn. E-mail:durong@mail.xidian.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    陕西省国际合作重点项目(2018KWZ-04);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771184);基本科研业务 (8002/20106184829)

Research on Channel Strategy for Intellectual Property Management Platform Considering Blockchain-based Evidence Credibility

ZHANG Hai-qiang1, DU Rong1, AI Shi-zhong1, PEI Qing-qi2, MA Li-chuan3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Xidian University,Xi’an 710071, China; 2. Shaanxi Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Secure Computing, Xi’an 710071, China; 3. State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, Xidian University, Xi’an 710071, China
  • Received:2020-05-09 Revised:2020-08-24 Online:2022-11-20 Published:2022-11-28
  • Contact: 杜荣 E-mail:durong@mail.xidian.edu.cn

摘要: 区块链技术能创造可信环境,其在知识产权管理中的应用受到业界关注。知识产权管理平台准确提供知识产权确权证据的能力(即确权可信能力)是非常重要的竞争指标,但在平台可选择多种确权渠道的情况下,其竞争的最佳策略问题尚未被研究。为解决此问题,本研究建立了三阶段博弈模型,分析传统渠道、区块链渠道、两种渠道同时开放下,两个寡头垄断型知识产权管理平台的最优竞争策略;并对模型进行扩展,研究新兴平台与现有平台竞争时的最佳策略。分析解析解和数值仿真结果得出以下结论:(1)双垄断平台竞争时,平台应根据高时效性要求的用户比例来选择竞争策略,比例低时,都同时开放传统渠道和区块链渠道,比例高时,一方仅提供传统渠道,另一方同时开放两种渠道。(2)新兴平台与现有平台竞争,在高时效性要求用户比例较低时,现有平台应当同步开放区块链渠道服务;比例较高时应当仅开放传统渠道。

关键词: 区块链;知识产权管理;博弈论;Hotelling模型;确权可信能力

Abstract: Blockchain technology can create a trustworthy environment, and as a result, its application to intellectual property (IP) management has received a lot of attention from the industry. The ability of IP management platforms to accurately provide evidence of IP rights confirmation (evidence credibility) is a very important competitive metric, but the question of the optimal strategies for platforms to compete when they can choose from multiple channels of confirmation has not been investigated. To address this issue, a three-stage game model is developed to analyze the optimal competition strategies of two oligopolistic IP management platforms through multiple channels, i.e., traditional channels, blockchain channels, and both channels open at the same time; and the model is extended to investigate the optimal strategies of emerging platforms when competing with existing platforms. The analytical solution and numerical simulation results lead to the following conclusions: (1) When the duopoly platforms compete, the platforms should choose their competition strategies according to the proportion of users with high timeliness requirements; when the proportion is low, both platforms provide only traditional channels; when the proportion is moderate, both platforms offer both traditional channels and blockchain channels; and when the proportion is high, one platform provides only traditional channels and the other platform provides both channels. (2) When the proportion of users with high timeliness requirements is low, the existing platforms should open the blockchain channel service simultaneously; when the proportion is high, the existing platforms should open only the traditional channel. This study provides guidance to the operational management of existing IP platforms, and also adds knowledge to the understanding of the impact of blockchain on specific industries.

Key words: blockchain; intellectual property management; game theory; hotelling model;evidence credibility

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