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中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (3): 30-42.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1786

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基于演化博弈的绿色技术创新环境政策选择研究:政府行为VS.公众参与

徐乐1, 马永刚2, 王小飞3   

  1. 1.上海财经大学城市与区域科学学院/财经研究所,上海200433;2.兰州财经大学工商管理学院,甘肃 兰州730000;3.中国海洋大学经济学院,山东 青岛266100
  • 收稿日期:2020-09-16 修回日期:2021-03-22 出版日期:2022-03-19 发布日期:2022-03-19
  • 通讯作者: 徐乐(1991-),女(汉族),黑龙江佳木斯人,上海财经大学财经研究所,博士后,博士,研究方向:环境管理与技术创新,Email:Alisaxu9110@163.com. E-mail:Alisaxu9110@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金重大项目(21ZDA084);中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目(2020T130397)

Study on Environmental Policy Selection for Green Technology Innovation Based on Evolutionary Game: Government Behavior vs. Public Participation

XU Le1, MA Yong-gang2, WANG Xiao-fei3   

  1. 1. School of Urban and Region Science, Institute of Finance and Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China;2. School of Business Administration, Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics, Lanzhou 730000, China;3. School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China
  • Received:2020-09-16 Revised:2021-03-22 Online:2022-03-19 Published:2022-03-19
  • Contact: 徐乐 E-mail:Alisaxu9110@163.com

摘要: 在中国“双碳”目标背景下,如何通过有效的环境政策驱动绿色技术创新以缓解节能减排压力是亟需解决的重要现实问题。本文基于多主体关系分析、演化博弈理论、情景模拟仿真方法,构建政府和企业、公众和企业的两方演化博弈模型以及政府、公众和企业的三方演化博弈模型,并在此基础上,进行不同情景模式和不同执行力度下的政策模拟仿真,综合探究政府、公众、企业在绿色技术创新中的行为策略选择和系统演化轨迹。研究发现:(1)两方演化博弈模型下,企业绿色技术创新行为与其成本收益密切相关,但有效的公众参与为企业在成本小于收益情况下进行绿色技术创新行为提供了可能,即公众参与是企业改变短视行为、进行前瞻性创新的关键因素;(2)三方演化博弈模型下,政府和公众的稳态条件与单独考虑政府和单独考虑公众的稳态条件相同;但企业的稳态条件则需考虑公众举报对企业声誉带来的影响,其是企业进行绿色技术创新行为决策的重要参考因素;(3)情景模拟仿真结果表明,随着环保宣传、技术创新激励、环境管制、公众关注、公众举报强度的增加,企业绿色技术创新行为的演化速度不断加快,即不同类型的政府行为与公众参与均会对绿色技术创新有显著促进作用。总结而言,在政府行为外生引导的基础上,应着重激发公众参与的重要调节效应,从而以企业利润为抓手引导绿色技术创新行为进入内生演化路径。

关键词: 绿色技术创新;政府行为;公众参与;演化博弈模型;情景模拟仿真

Abstract: To relieve the pressure of energy conservation and emission reduction, how to drive green technology innovation through effective environmental policies is an important practical issue that needs to be solved urgently, in the context of China’s “double carbon” goal. Based on multi-agent relationship analysis, evolutionary game theory, and scenario simulation method, the two-party evolutionary game model of government and enterprise, the two-party evolutionary game model of public and enterprise, and the three-party evolutionary game model of government, public, and enterprise are constructed. Besides, policy simulation under different scenario modes and execution strengths are conducted to comprehensively explore the behavioral strategy selection and system evolution trajectory of the government, public, and enterprises in green technology innovation. The results show that: (1) In the two-party evolutionary game, the green technology innovation behavior of enterprises is closely related to its cost and benefit. However, effective public participation provides the possibility for enterprises to conduct green technology innovation behavior when the cost is less than the benefit. In other words, public participation is the key factor for enterprises to change short-sighted behavior and carry out forward-looking innovation; (2) In the three-party evolutionary game, the steady-state conditions of government and public are the same as those in two-party evolutionary game models. However, the steady-state condition of enterprises needs to consider the impact of the public report on corporate reputation, which is an important reference factor for enterprises to make decisions on green technology innovation behavior; (3) With the increase of environmental protection publicity, technology innovation incentive, environmental regulation, public concern, and public report, the evolution of enterprises’ innovation behavior of choosing green technology is accelerating, and green technology innovation is promoted by government behavior and public participation significantly. To sum up, on the basis of exogenous guidance of government behavior, public participation should be encouraged to guide the green technology innovation behavior into the endogenous evolution path considering the enterprise profit.

Key words: green technology innovation; government behavior; public participation; evolutionary game model; scenario simulation

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