基于分期付款的服务供应商合作意愿甄别研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2013, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 118-124.

基于分期付款的服务供应商合作意愿甄别研究

王陆玲¹, 王国锋¹, 赖明勇², 周杨²

1. 中国公路工程咨询集团有限公司, 北京 100101;
2. 湖南大学工商管理学院, 湖南长沙 410079

收稿日期:2010-12-17 修回日期:2012-06-25 出版日期:2013-02-28 发布日期:2013-02-26
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70925006);国家社会科学基金资助项目(07&ZD017)

Study on Cooperative Wills Screening of Service Providers Based on Installment

WANG Lu-ling¹, WANG Guo-feng¹, LAI Ming-yong², ZHOU Yang²

1. China Highway Engineering Consulting Group Compang limited, Beijing 100101, China;
2. College of Management, Hunan University, Changsha 410079, China

Received:2010-12-17 Revised:2012-06-25 Online:2013-02-28 Published:2013-02-26

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 服务外包中信息不对称问题阻碍了服务外包的健康快速发展。服务需求商选择合适的服务供应商,并对服务供应商专用性人力资本进行有效的监督与激励是服务外包成功的先决条件。本文将分期付款方式引入到服务外包合同设计中,构建了信息不对称情况下服务供应商真实合作意愿的甄别模型,设计了有效分离不同类型服务供应商的报酬机制,并用实际案例验证了本模型的科学性与适用性,为服务需求商选择服务供应商提供了参考。

关键词: 服务外包, 分期付款, 合作意愿, 信息甄别

Abstract: The asymmetry information hinders the healthy development of service outsourcing. Choosing the appropriate service providers, and the effective supervision and incentives on the specific human capital is the precondition for successful outsourcing. The installment is introduced into the contract design of service outsourcing, a screening model is constructed for the real cooperative wills of service providers under the asymmetric information and the payment mechanisms are designed for the effective separation of different types of service providers. A case is used to validate the scientificity and applicability of the model,which sets a guide for the service demanders to choose the appropriate service providers.

Key words: service outsourcing, installment, cooperative wills, screening

中图分类号:

F270

王陆玲, 王国锋, 赖明勇, 周杨. 基于分期付款的服务供应商合作意愿甄别研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, (1): 118-124.

WANG Lu-ling, WANG Guo-feng, LAI Ming-yong, ZHOU Yang. Study on Cooperative Wills Screening of Service Providers Based on Installment[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2013, (1): 118-124.

参考文献

[1] Jae-Nam L.The impact of knowledge sharing, organizational capability and partnership qual-ity on IS outsourcing success [J].Information and Management, 2001, (38):323-335.
[2] Laffont J,Tirole J.A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation [M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1993.
[3] Fudenberg K.Game theory [M].Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
[4] Phanse K S, DaSilva L A.Addressing the requirements of QoS management for wireless ad hoc networks [J].Computer Communications,2003,26(12):1263-1273.
[5] Kahraman C, Cebeci U, Ulukan Z. Multicriteria supplier selection using fuzzy AHP[J]. Logistics Information Management, 2003, 16(6): 382-394.
[6] Jharkharia S, Shankar R.Selection of log-istics service provider:an analytic network pr-ocess(ANP)approach [J].Omega, 2007, 35(3): 274-289.
[7] 梁建英,李垣,廖貅武.信号服务成本与服务外包供应商信号传递关系的博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(1):99-105.
[8] 田宇.面向信息甄别的第三方物流分包合同模型研究[J].软科学, 2004, 18(6): 31-33.
[9] 傅烨,陈曦.基于甄别模型的第三方物流外包合同研究[J].物流技术, 2009, 28(3): 77-79.
[10] 邓玉林,王文平.基于人力资本产权的知识型员工激励机制研究 [J].中国管理科学, 2009, 17(1): 151-156.
[11] 姚敬.服务外包企业人力资本套牢问题研究.西安电子科技大学,2008.
[12] 刘征驰,赖明勇.进入权、声誉与服务外包组织治理[J].当代经济科学, 2010, (1): 98-105.
[13] 黄波,孟卫东,李宇雨.基于机制设计的研发外包最优利益分配方式选择 [J].科技管理研究, 2009, 29, (11): 5-10.
[14] 石春生,孟大鹏.供应商分类管理的新视觉-综合考量供应商的企业能力与合作意愿[J].企业管理, 2010, (8):76-78.
[15] 王陆玲,刘征驰,周杨,等.基于专用性人力资本的服务供应商信号传递研究 [J].软科学, 2011, 25(8): 100-103.
[16] Stiglitz J E. The theory of "screening" education,and the distribution of income [J]. The American Economic Review, 1975, 65(3): 283-300.
[17] 江小涓.服务外包:合约形态变革及其理论蕴意 [J].经济研究, 2008, (7): 4-10.