主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

中国管理科学 ›› 2007, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (3): 114-122.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于工期协调的项目公司与承包商收益激励模型

陈建华, 马士华   

  1. 华中科技大学管理学院 湖北武汉430074
  • 收稿日期:2006-03-13 修回日期:2007-04-19 出版日期:2007-06-30 发布日期:2007-06-30
  • 作者简介:陈建华(1977- ),男(汉族),湖北松滋市人,华中科技大学管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:项目协调管理理论与决策方法、物流与供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    南京长江第三大桥科学研究计划项目(XY-121-00000-0311)

A Revenue Incentive Model of Project Duration Coordination between Project Corporation and Contractor

CHEN Jian-hua, MA Shi-hua   

  1. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science & Technology, Wuhan 430074, China
  • Received:2006-03-13 Revised:2007-04-19 Online:2007-06-30 Published:2007-06-30

摘要: 从项目公司和承包商双层角度,考虑项目公司通过显性收益激励契约手段与单一标段承包商之间就工期目标优化问题进行协调决策.假设决策过程是一个完全信息的动态博弈过程,基于博弈论并应用二层规划方法建立了以项目公司为主方、承包商为从方的Stackelberg主从递阶收益激励模型,采用逆向归纳法并引入拉格朗日函数对问题进行分情形讨论,设计了遗传算法求解该非线性规划问题的子博弈精练纳什均衡解.算例结果表明,项目公司通过提供一定的收益激励而非传统指令性手段促使承包商在可压缩范围内积极主动地去压缩项目工期,可以实现项目工期控制目标协调优化和双方收益目标的帕累托改善.

关键词: 项目管理, 工期协调, 收益激励, 二层规划

Abstract: From perspective of project corporation and contractor in construction project,problem of project duration coordination decision-making between the project corporation and one contractor through explicit incentive contract was considered.Assumed that the decision-making process is a dynamic game under perfect information,a Stackelberg revenue incentive contract model with the project corporation as the leader and the contractor as the follower was constructed based on the game theory and method of bi-level programming Based on the backw ard induction,Lagrange function was applied to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution of the nonlinear programming model in different conditions,and corresponding genetic algorithm was designed Finally,a numerical study showed that revenue incentive mechanism can help to actualize optimization of project duration coordination and Pareto improvement of revenue for two parties in the contract on condition that the project corporation expects the contractor to actively compress project duration furthest by supporting revenue incentive measures instead of traditional direct in structions.

Key words: project management, project duration coordination, revenue incentive, bi-level programming

中图分类号: