研发项目投资决策与最优政府补贴研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0896

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (2): 63-72.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0896cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0896

研发项目投资决策与最优政府补贴研究

甘柳¹, 李群翅²

1.闽江学院新华都商学院，福建福州350108； 2.江西财经大学金融学院，江西南昌330013

收稿日期:2020-05-17 修回日期:2020-07-03 出版日期:2023-02-20 发布日期:2023-02-28
通讯作者: 甘柳(1983-)，男(汉族)，湖南汨罗人，闽江学院新华都商学院，教师，博士，研究方向：金融工程，Email：ganliu2016@163.com. E-mail:ganliu2016@163.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72161016，71661008)

Research on R&D Project Investment Decision and Optimal Government Subsidies

GAN Liu¹, LI Qun-chi²

1. Newhuadu Business School, Minjiang University, Fuzhou 350108, China;2. School of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China

Received:2020-05-17 Revised:2020-07-03 Online:2023-02-20 Published:2023-02-28
Contact: 甘柳 E-mail:ganliu2016@163.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 补贴是政府支持企业创新的重要方式之一。在政府采取研发项目资金补贴策略的基础上，构建政府和企业家双方博弈的不确定性投资与融资模型，并给出博弈均衡下最优投资时机、投资成本、融资策略以及最优政府补贴的显式表达式。研究发现企业家的债务协商能力会影响到政府对企业的补贴策略，只有当企业家在债务市场拥有一定议价能力的时候，政府补贴才能有效缓解研发项目的投资不足问题。另外，随着企业收益流的不确定性的增加，均衡下政府补贴出现先增后减的趋势，政府应尽可能根据不同风险的研发项目来采取补贴策略。本文的结论从理论上丰富了已有研发补贴政策的研究，为政府更有针对性实施补贴政策提供有益参考。

关键词: 研发项目；不确定性投资；协商；融资决策；研发补贴

Abstract: One of the key strategic decisions in firms concerns the timing and financing of an investment. However, bonds are not the only source of financing key strategic investments. Government subsidy is an important source of financing. The government uses the subsidy to help the R&D enterprises to solve the problems of insufficient investment. According to a recent report by National Bureau of Statistics. The total expenditure on R&D activities in China was 2,173.7 billion yuan in 2019, with an average annual growth rate of 10.73% from 2015 to 2019. Among them, the total expenditure on R&D activities by companies in 2019 can account for about 79%, and the government accounts for 21%. The state’s financial science and technology funds are increasing year by year at an average annual rate of 12.9%.

Key words: R&D project; uncertain investment; negotiation; financing; government subsidies

中图分类号:

F830

甘柳,李群翅. 研发项目投资决策与最优政府补贴研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(2): 63-72.

GAN Liu,LI Qun-chi. Research on R&D Project Investment Decision and Optimal Government Subsidies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(2): 63-72.

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研发项目投资决策与最优政府补贴研究

Research on R&D Project Investment Decision and Optimal Government Subsidies

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