主管：中国科学院
主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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Chinese Journal of Management Science

Chinese Journal of Management Science >

2025 , Vol. 33 >Issue 7: 232 - 242

DOI: https://doi.org/10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0423

Research on Emergency Supplies Reserve Strategy of Government-enterprise Cooperation from the Perspective of Hierarchical Responsibility

  • Jihai Zhang ,
  • Qichang Guo ,
  • Xu Jiang ,
  • Zhengfan Yang
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  • 1.Institute of National Security and Development Studies，Beijing Institute of Technology，Beijing 100081，China
    2.Management School，Beijing Institute of Technology，Beijing 100081，China
    3.School of Logistics，Beijing Wuzi University，Beijing 101149，China
    4.School of Economics & Management，University of Science and Technology Beijing，Beijing 100083，China

Received date: 2022-03-02

  Revised date: 2024-05-15

  Online published: 2025-08-06

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Abstract

At present， China has formed an pattern of emergency reserves with vertical linkage of governments at all levels and horizontal support of government-enterprise coordination. In the 2019 COVID-19 epidemic， the emergency supplies reserve system of China has exposed many problems. From the perspective of the government， there are limited incentives for the central government’s support measures to incentive local governments. From the perspective of government-enterprise cooperation， social reserves have not yet been widely used， and companies do not have sufficient motivation to reach a reserve agreement with the government. In order to improve the emergency supply and reserve system， the theory of evolution of the evolution is applied， and a three-party evolution game model composed of the central government， local governments， and reserve enterprises is built. Based on the payment function of each participant， the dynamic equation of each subject was determined， and the local balance points and evolutionary stability strategies of each subject in the evolutionary process are calculated， and the conditions for the implementation of each evolutionary stability strategy are determined. Through numerical simulation， the effects of the model's main influencing factors on the decision-making of emergency reserve participants. The results show that increasing the agreed reserve fee is conducive to enterprises participation in emergency supplies reserve， but it is not conducive to the long-term preservation of local governments； the central government’s special funding for disaster relief has limited impact on enhancing the willingness of government and enterprises to cooperate and reserve； in the construction of the central emergency reserve， the different levels of local government agent construction cost ratios will have a significant impact on the evolution path of local governments； there is no difference in the strategic choices of local governments under different government-enterprise subsidy sharing ratios， but it will have a positive incentive effect for enterprises to participate in reserves. In the future， it is necessary to reasonably determine the reserve cost of emergency supplies agreement， change the implementation thinking of emergency management， innovate the emergency reserve investment model， increase the distribution of central subsidies to enterprises， further improve the emergency material reserve system to realize the modernization of emergency management capabilities.

Key words： emergency supplies reserve; hierarchical responsibility; reserve enterprise; three-party evolutionary game

Cite this article

Jihai Zhang , Qichang Guo , Xu Jiang , Zhengfan Yang . Research on Emergency Supplies Reserve Strategy of Government-enterprise Cooperation from the Perspective of Hierarchical Responsibility[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025 , 33(7) : 232 -242 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0423

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