A large number of stakeholders are involved in the energy emergency process. It is necessary for each region and each department to achieve multi-agent, multi-level, and multi-level collaborative linkages in order to efficiently respond to energy emergency. However, in the current process of China's energy emergency collaboration, the problems of temporary and over-reliance on the government are exposed. At the same time, scholars have relatively little research on energy emergency collaboration. Based on practice and theoretical status, the sudden energy shortage emergency collaboration between the government and the energy supply chain companies is divided into two cases. One is no previous emergency resources investment, and the other is a previous emergency resources investment. To establishing the model, a performance function is adopted to measure the synergistic performance brought by the emergency resources input of the government and the energy supply chain enterprises. It is also introduced variables to indicate the government's participation in the emergency collaboration process, and the compensation coefficient to measure the government's compensation for energy supply chain enterprises. Through the mathematical derivation of the government, the energy supply chain enterprises, and the two parties' common expected revenue function, it is obtained the optimal collaborative participation, optimal resource input, and optimal synergies in both scenarios. With comparative analysis of the two cases, it is showed that the optimal collaborative involvement degree which is affected by marginal collaborative benefit and compensation effort in both cases are same. The compensation effort of government is positively correlated with the collaborative involvement degree of energy supply chain companies, and the collaborative involvement degree of government is negatively correlated with the marginal collaborative benefit of energy supply chain companies. The emergency collaborative resource is positively related with the collaborative involvement degree of government, while negatively related with its compensation effort. The efficient daily emergency resource investment will help improve the current energy emergency collaboration benefit, and vice versa. Through the numerical analysis of examples, the results of the study were verified and explained visually. To improve energy emergency collaboration efficiency, it is recommended that the government should establish normalization emergency management system and clearly define the roles, rational division of labor. It is necessary to accelerate the construction of energy emergency compensation mechanism for mobilizing emergency initiative of energy supply chain enterprises and assuming their more responsibility.
LIU Xiao-yan, LV Tao
. Study on Energy Emergency Collaboration Considering Early and Current Resource Inputs[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019
, 27(3)
: 180
-188
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.03.018
[1] Department of Energy. Energy Sector-Specific Plan 2010:An annex to the national infrastructure protection plan[R].Working Paper, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,2010.
[2] Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group. Roadmap to secure energy delivery systems[R].Working Paper, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011.
[3] International Energy Agency. IEA response system for oil supply emergencies[R].Working Paper, IEA Publications,2014.
[4] 李昕.国际能源机构应急石油管理制度对我国的启示[J].西南石油大学学报(社会科学版),2015,17(6):9-18.
[5] 吕涛.突发性能源短缺的应急体系研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(4):105-110.
[6] 吕涛,富莉.石油应急管理活动识别及系统结构分析[J].中国矿业,2017,26(7):1-6.
[7] Clemente J. General interest:Drawdown uncertainty among issues for SPR[J]. Oil and Gas Journal,2009,107(38):18-20.
[8] Gao Dan, Li Zheng, Yang Chenggang, et al. China oil price-gdp elasticity coefficient and optimal strategic petroleum reserve scale analysis[J]. Advanced Materials Researh,2011,347-353:98-102.
[9] 孙金玉,张力菠,汤铭端.不同规模下华东地区煤炭应急储备轮库仿真研究[J].系统仿真学报,2014,26(2):248-253.
[10] 刘满芝,屈传智,冯颖.国家煤炭应急储备布局模型构建及应用[J].中国安全科学学报,2014,24(8):113-118.
[11] 李银涯.供应中断情景下的战略石油储备优化研究[D].镇江:江苏科技大学,2016.
[12] 王政.长三角地区成品油应急储备及布局规划研究[D].徐州:中国矿业大学,2016.
[13] 朱维娜.突发性石油短缺的演化机理及多主体应急响应研究[D].徐州:中国矿业大学,2015.
[14] 刘晓燕,吕涛.突发性能源短缺应急主体演化博弈研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(5):154-159.
[15] 吕涛,富莉.中国与IEA石油应急合作演化博弈分析[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2016,38(6):641-646.
[16] 张乐,王慧敏,佟金萍.突发水灾害应急合作的行为博弈研究模型[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(4):92-97.
[17] 李勇建,王治莹.突发事件中舆情传播机制与演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(11):87-96.
[18] 张乐,王慧敏,佟金萍.干旱灾害应急水资源合作储备模型研究[J].资源科学,2014,36(2):342-350.
[19] 刘德海,王维国,孙康.基于演化博弈的重大突发公共卫生事件情景预测模型与防控措施[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(5):937-946.
[20] 张子健,刘伟.供应链中合作产品开发的任务分配决策分析[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(4):42-47.
[21] 刘征驰,石庆书,张晓换.不同决策模式下服务供应链知识协作机制研究[J].科技进步与对策,2015,32(4):124-128.
[22] Samaddar S, Kadiyala S S. An analysis of inter organizational resource sharing decisions in collaborative knowledge creation[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2006,170(1):192-210.
[23] 陈洪转,刘思峰,何利芳."主制造商-供应商"协同主体双重努力最优合作协调[J].系统工程,2012,30(7):30-34.
[24] 熊榆,张雪斌,熊中楷.合作新产品开发资金及知识投入决策研究[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(9):53-63.
[25] 时茜茜,朱建波,盛昭瀚.重大工程供应链协同合作利益分配研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(5):42-51.
[26] 陈洪转,方志耕,刘思峰,等.复杂产品制造商-供应商协同合作最有成本分担激励研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(9):98-105.
[27] 陈正杨.社会救援资源应急供应链的协同管理[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2013,15(3):95-99.
[28] 顾建华,邹其嘉.加强城市灾害应急管理能力建设确保城市的可持续发展[J].防灾技术高等专科学校学报,2005,7(2):1-5.
[29] 李江涛.能源应急管理:国际实践与中国探索[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2011.
[30] 汪伟全.论区域应急联动的协同能力[J].探索与争鸣,2013,(5):50-53.
[31] 李真.基于计算实验的工程供应链协调优化研究[D].南京:南京大学,2012.
[32] Teece D C. Capturing value from knowledge assets:The new economy, markets for know-how, and intangible assets[J].California Management Review,1998,40(3):55-79.
[33] Stepha P E. The economics of science[J].Journal of Economic Literature,1996,XXXIV:1199-1235.
[34] Argote L. Organizational learning:Creating, retaining and transferring knowledge[M]. Boston:Kluwer,1999.
[35] 杨瑾,尤建新,蔡依平.供应链企业在协同知识创造中的合作决策研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理, 2006, (4):149-153.
