Abstract:

With the substantial growth of new energy vehicles， the lack of charging infrastructure has become the main bottleneck restricting the development of the new energy vehicle industry. However， the investment of a single enterprise has been difficult to meet the increasing cost and complexity requirements of charging infrastructure construction， and the use of cross-shareholding strategy to seek external resource integration has been widely adopted. For example， Denso Corporation of Japan and Toyota have maintained close cooperation based on cross-shareholding. Based on the shareholding strategy and subsidy policy， game theory and operations research optimization methods are used to develop models for different scenarios. Considering the new energy vehicle supply chain， the battery supplier provide batteries to the new energy vehicle manufacturer at the wholesale price， and the new energy vehicle manufacturer sells the new energy vehicles to consumers at the selling price， and four models are constructed： （a） neither cross-shareholding nor government subsidy； （b） no cross-shareholding but with government subsidy； （c） no government subsidy but with cross-shareholding； （d） both cross-shareholding and government subsidy， to analyze the impact of cross-shareholding and government subsidies. In order to draw valuable conclusions， the model is analyzed through numerical analysis. The results show that the cross-shareholding strategy can promote the investment in the construction of charging stations， but only when the construction cost is high or the construction cost is low and the shareholding ratio of the manufacturer is low， the shareholding strategy will increase the incentive effect of government subsidies. When the government subsidy budget is high， the cross-shareholding strategy will strengthen the subsidy effect. The wholesale price and the selling price both increase in the shareholding ratio of the manufacturer， while the impact of the shareholding ratio of the supplier on the wholesale price and the selling price is non-monotonic. The supplier can always benefit from the cross-shareholding strategy， and only if the construction cost is low and the manufacturer’s shareholding is below a certain threshold， the manufacturer can benefit from the cross-shareholding strategy. The research gap of the combination of cross-shareholding strategy and charging infrastructure investment is filled， and the optimal design of government subsidies under different objectives is discussed， in order to provide reference for policymakers.

Key words: cross-shareholding, charging infrastructure, government subsidy