平台裁决还是专家评审？——电商平台在线纠纷解决机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.2233

Abstract

Abstract:

The prosperity of e-commerce has been promoted by the rapid development of Internet technology， but a large number of online disputes between merchants and consumers have also been brought about. The “efficient， convenient and low-cost” Online Dispute Resolution （ODR） has become an important way of resolving online disputes. Among them， a platform adjudication mechanism centered on its own adjudication is adopted by some e-commerce platforms， while disputes are resolved by hiring expert juries by others. Therefore， how to scientifically choose an online dispute resolution mechanism to better resolve online disputes and enhance platform profits is an important decision-making issue faced by e-commerce platforms. Focusing on the problem， the Stackelberg game method is used by this paper to construct a game model between e-commerce platforms and merchants under two mechanisms： platform adjudication and expert review. The impact of the two review mechanisms on platform evaluation standards， product quality， profits， etc. is explored， and the relative advantages of the platform adjudication mechanism and the expert review mechanism are analyzed. The optimal choice and decision optimization of online dispute resolution mechanisms for e-commerce platforms are studied. The study shows that the selection strategy of the online dispute resolution mechanism of e-commerce platforms is mainly determined by the proportion of consumer disputes and the cost coefficient of quality for merchants. The subjective decision-making bias of the platforms can be eliminated by the expert review mechanism， and higher quality standards will be set by the platforms under the platform adjudication mechanism in order to motivate the merchants to improve the quality of their products and increase the surplus of consumers at the same time. At the same time， the penalties for merchants will be reduced by the platforms with the increase of the proportion of consumer disputes. The findings of this study may provide useful management insights for e-commerce platforms in online dispute management and industry development.

Key words: e-commerce platforms, online disputes, mechanism selection, decision optimization

CLC Number:

F272

Zhongzhong Jiang,Zhining Jiang,Na He. Platform Adjudication or Expert Review? Study on the Online Dispute Resolution Mechanism of E-commerce Platforms[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(1): 178-189.

Figures/Tables 11

	符号	说明
角标	$i$	$i ∈ {S, P}$ ，分别代表商家和平台
角标	$j$	$j ∈ {P L, E X}$ ，分别代表平台裁决机制和专家评审机制
决策变量	$q j$	$j$ 机制下的产品质量
	$f j$	纠纷发生且商家失败时， $j$ 机制下平台向商家收取的罚款
	$k$	平台评估的质量标准
模型参数	$Π j i$	$j$ 机制下 $i$ 的利润
	$β$	消费者发生纠纷的比例
	$γ$	平台收取的佣金比例
	$p$	产品价格
	$φ$	消费者对产品的质量感知
	$C S j$	$j$ 机制下的消费者剩余
	$h P L q P L, k$	平台裁决机制下商家获胜的概率
	$h E X q E X$	专家评审机制下商家获胜的概率
	$α$	质量成本系数
	$θ$	声誉系数
	$y$	行业标准
	$c$	专家评审机制下的成本
	$x j$	$j$ 机制下平台或专家获得的产品质量信息
	$σ$	比例因子
	$ϵ$	均匀分布在 $- 1,1$ 上的噪声项

符号	平台裁决机制
$k *$	$p β - 8 y β θ σ - 4 α σ 2 4 α σ - 8 β θ σ$
$h P L *$	$- p β 2 θ + 4 α σ y β θ + 2 α σ - 3 β θ σ 8 α α - 2 β θ σ 2$
$q P L *$	$β p - α + β θ + 4 α θ σ y + σ 4 α 2 β θ - α σ$
$f P L *$	$p α γ + p β 1 - 2 γ θ - 4 α θ σ y + σ α - 2 β θ$
$Π P L S *$	$p 2 β 4 θ 2 - α 2 β 2 - 48 α 2 β 2 θ 2 σ 2 y + σ 2 - 8 p α σ y β 2 θ β θ - 2 α - 8 p α σ 2 α 2 - 1 + γ - 2 α β β + 4 γ - 4 θ + β 2 β + 8 γ - 8 θ 2 σ 16 α α - 2 β θ 2 σ 2$
$Π P L P *$	$p 2 β 3 θ + 16 α 2 β θ σ 2 y + σ 2 - 8 p α σ y β 2 θ + 2 α γ σ + β β - 4 γ θ σ 16 α 2 β θ - α σ 2$
$C S P L *$	$p 2 β 3 θ - 8 α β θ σ 2 y + σ φ - 2 p σ 2 y α β 2 θ + 4 α 2 σ + α β 2 β θ σ - 8 θ σ - φ + β 2 θ φ 8 α α - 2 β θ σ 2$

符号	专家评审机制
$h E X *$	$p β + 4 α σ - y + 3 σ 16 α σ 2$
$q E X *$	$18 p β α σ + 4 y + σ$
$f E X *$	$p - 12 + γ + 2 α σ y + σ β$
$Π E X S *$	$164 p 2 β 2 α σ 2 - 48 α y + σ 2 - 8 p y β + - 8 + β + 8 γ σ σ$
$Π E X P *$	$p 2 β 2 - 8 p α σ y β + β - 4 γ σ + 16 α σ 2 - 2 c β + y 2 α + 2 β θ + 2 y α σ + α σ 2 32 α σ 2$
$C S E X *$	$- p 2 β 2 + 8 α σ 2 y + σ φ + 2 p σ 2 y α β + 2 α β σ - 8 α σ + β φ 16 α σ 2$

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对比项	平台裁决	专家评审
评审员	平台对应专员	第三方专家陪审团
裁决人数	1人	3人及以上
聘请成本	较低	较高
裁决专业度	较低	较高
大众信任度	较低	较高

Platform Adjudication or Expert Review? Study on the Online Dispute Resolution Mechanism of E-commerce Platforms

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