Abstract:

Under the “dual carbon” goal， Chinese enterprises have been carrying out green transformation and upgrading， and strengthening the sales of low-carbon products through both online and offline channels. However， the high investment in green transformation and the operating costs of dual channels often lead to financial difficulties for enterprises. At this time， the government’s low-carbon subsidies and combined financing have become important ways to solve the financial difficulties of supply chain enterprises. Supply chain emission reduction decision models are constructed for dual channel low-carbon supply chains with bilateral financing constraints， including “government subsidies+trade credit”， “government subsidies+trade credit+bank lending”， and “government subsidies+bilateral bank lending”. The optimal decision is solved and analyzed based on stackelberg game theory. The impact of government subsidy ratios， consumer low-carbon preferences， and initial capital scale of enterprises on the optimal decision-making， profits， and social welfare of various entities， and the preferences of various entities for different combination financing models under different market conditions are explored. The results indicate that under the no financial constraint mode and the “government subsidy+trade credit” financing combination mode， the emission reduction level of manufacturer is the same and higher than that under other modes. Under bilateral financial constraints， when a manufacturer provides trade credit to a retailer， the retailer may earn higher profits than it would without financial constraints. For the retailer， the highest profit is obtained under the financing combination model of “government subsidies+trade credit”， while the lowest profit is obtained under the financing combination model of “government subsidies+bilateral bank lending”. For the manufacturer， when the sensitivity to delayed payment wholesale prices is relatively low， he prefers to choose the “government subsidy+trade credit” financing combination model. Otherwise， he prefers to choose the “government subsidy+bilateral bank lending” financing combination model. For the overall social welfare of the government， under the model of no financial constraint and the combination financing model of “government subsidies+trade credit”， the level of overall social welfare is the same and reaches its maximum. Overall， it contributes to the existing literature in this study by comprehensively analyzing the emission reduction decisions and financing methods of dual channel low-carbon supply chains under government subsidies. It provides decision-making reference and theoretical basis for dual channel low-carbon supply chain managers with bilateral financial constraints to formulate corresponding pricing and emission reduction strategies for different combination financing models.

Key words: bilateral financial constraints, dual channel supply chain, government subsidy, carbon emission reduction, financing methods