Abstract:

In carbon reduction cooperation， the nature of the relationship between manufacturing enterprises and low-carbon service providers is a typical “principal-agent” relationship， in which both parties are “economic agents” who maximize their own interests. In view of this， manufacturers and embedded low-carbon service providers are taken as research objects， the carbon allowance trading mechanism， low-carbon service providers to business embedded and capital investment in the way of participating in the manufacturer's energy saving and emission reduction services are considered， different revenue sharing models are designed to reasonably carry out the distribution of revenues， the two sides of the low-carbon service contract preferences are analyzed under different contractual standards， supply chain carbon emission reduction efficiency and revenue sharing coordination， and the influence of relevant parameters on the optimal decision-making is explored， and verify the effectiveness of the decision-making model through numerical simulation analysis.The first part is to analyze the behavioral mechanism of the subject members on the basis of summarizing and organizing relevant literature. Taking a system composed of a manufacturer and an embedded low-carbon service provider aiming to promote energy saving and emission reduction through the consistency of low-carbon emission reduction service contract as the research object， the inconsistency of contractual preferences generated by both parties is considered， and a dynamic game model between the system subjects is constructed.The second part is to solve the optimal decision-making of the embedded low-carbon service participating subjects under different contract objectives. Firstly， different revenue sharing models are designed to reasonably distribute the revenue， and the optimal service cost of the manufacturer and the energy-saving and emission reduction efficiency and business investment of the low-carbon service provider are calculated； then， the impacts of embeddedness， energy-saving and emission reduction capacity and carbon trading price on the optimal decision-making of both parties under different contractual standards are analyzed， the upper and lower bounds of the embeddedness and the carbon trading price are determined， and further the optimal decision-making of the participating subjects under different contractual standards is analyzed. The preference of participating subjects for low-carbon service contracts with different contract objectives is also analyzed； finally， this is used as a benchmark to compare and the data sharing willingness of the e-commerce platform and the supply chain system as a whole is analyzed.The third part is to construct a transfer payment mechanism to coordinate the preference conflict. Under the premise of the valid interval of the two cooperation contracts being established at the same time， the environmental performance and economic benefits of embedded low-carbon service providers and manufacturers in these two contracts are analyzed， and then whether the contract conflict problem occurs between the two parties of the participating subjects is analyzed， as well as how to coordinate the contract conflict problem， so as to make the two parties reach a consistent contractual preference， thus realizing the long-term sustainable cooperation between the low-carbon service providers and manufacturers.The fourth part is a simulation analysis of the optimal decision-making of the embedded low-carbon service participants， which visualizes the contractual preferences of the participants and the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism. It is found that the establishment of the two low-carbon service contracts depends on the embeddedness of the participating parties and the carbon emissions trading price， whether the contract is based on the carbon emission reduction rate or the revenue from the sales of emission reduction products， and the validity of the two contracts can be ensured only if the two factors are within a certain threshold range at the same time. Although the emission reduction rate and manufacturer's profit are optimal under the technology trading-type contract， low carbon service providers do not necessarily agree to this contract from their own interests due to the difference in embeddedness， and the two parties will have a conflict of contractual preferences， which can be coordinated by the manufacturer to provide a transfer payment mechanism to achieve consistency in the contract of the two parties' choices.Finally， based on the above findings， targeted recommendations from manufacturers， low-carbon service providers and government decision-making are put forward， which provides theoretical and practical references to significantly improve economic efficiency and promote the transformation of China's manufacturing industry into a green and low-carbon industry.

Key words: carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, contractual options, cooperative emissions reduction, embedded low carbon services, embeddedness