基于最小成本反向图模型的双渠道供应链碳减排冲突研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1825

Abstract

Abstract:

With the implementation of carbon cap-and-trade policies， as well as the enhancement of consumers’ low-carbon awareness， carbon reduction has gained widespread attention in the dual-channel supply chain. In the dual-channel supply chain comprised of an online channel for manufacturers and a brick-and-mortar retail channel for retailers， the carbon reduction strategies of manufacturers affect not only their own cost structure but also the channel interests of retailers. Owing to the dispute in terms of supply of low-carbon products and cost sharing of carbon reduction， there is a carbon reduction conflict between manufacturers and retailers. When mediating the carbon reduction conflict， it often needs cost to guide decision makers to change their preferences. Generally， the cost arising from this process is expected to be as small as possible. Consequently a minimum cost inverse graph model for conflict resolution （GMCR） model is proposed， which aims to provide references for designing cost-optimal mediation strategies to coordinate the carbon reduction conflict. Firstly， matrix formulation with additive preference relations to calculate individual stability and equilibrium is designed for the following solution concepts： Nash stability， GMR stability （General Metarationality） and SMR stability （Symmetric Metarationality）， respectively. Then， minimum cost inverse GMCR models with Nash， GMR and SMR stabilities are presented to obtain the optimal preference information such that the desired equilibrium is reached. Finally， an example regarding the carbon reduction conflict in the dual-channel supply chain of the household appliance industry is provided to demonstrate the application of the proposed models. From the application， the optimal preference information and the cost of preference adjustment under Nash， GMR and SMR stability are obtained， among which the cost under the Nash stability is the largest. With the support of the proposed minimum cost inverse GMCR models， minimum cost conflict mediation strategies can be designed to resolve conflict problems.

Key words: dual-channel supply chain, carbon reduction, inverse graph model for conflict resolution, minimum cost, optimization theory

CLC Number:

C934

Hengjie Zhang,Juan Liu,Wenfeng Zhu, et al. Conflict Management in Carbon Reduction in Dual-channel Supply Chain: An Approach Based on Minimum Cost Inverse GMCR[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(10): 212-224.

Figures/Tables 3

决策者	策略	$s 1$	$s 2$	$s 3$	$s 4$	$s 5$	$s 6$	$s 7$	$s 8$	$s 9$	$s 10$	$s 11$	$s 12$	$s 13$
家电制造商( $D M 1$ )	购买碳配额	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$-$
	高水平低碳技术投资	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$-$
	低水平低碳技术投资	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$Y$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$-$
国美( $D M 2$ )	分担低碳技术投资成本	$N$	$N$	$Y$	$Y$	$N$	$N$	$Y$	$Y$	$N$	$Y$	$N$	$Y$	$-$
	减少批发量	$N$	$Y$	$N$	$Y$	$N$	$Y$	$N$	$Y$	$N$	$N$	$Y$	$Y$	$-$
	终止渠道合作	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$N$	$Y$

状态	APNash稳定			APGMR稳定			APSMR稳定
状态	$D M 1$	$D M 2$	E	$D M 1$	$D M 2$	E	$D M 1$	$D M 2$	E
$s 1$	√			√			√
$s 2$	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 3$				√			√
$s 4$				√			√
$s 5$				√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 6$		√		√	√	*		√
$s 7$	√			√	√	*	√
$s 8$	√			√			√
$s 9$		√		√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 10$				√			√
$s 11$				√	√	*		√
$s 12$				√	√		√
$s 13$	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*

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Conflict Management in Carbon Reduction in Dual-channel Supply Chain: An Approach Based on Minimum Cost Inverse GMCR

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