政府干预下装配式建筑产业链核心企业协作策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1156

Abstract

Abstract:

The cooperation level of the core enterprises of the prefabricated construction industry chain affects the integrity of the industry chain and the improvement of production performance. The government usually adopts administrative intervention means such as financial subsidies and land support to promote the integration and development of the industry chain. An evolutionary game model of cooperative behavior among three groups of prefabricated construction core enterprises （design units， component manufacturers and construction companies） is constructed under government intervention， and the influence of initial strategy and key parameters on the evolution path of tripartite strategies is analyzed by using the system dynamics method. The research results show that under the positive government intervention， the design unit， the tripartite strategies of the design unit， component manufacturer and construction company influence each other. When the initial probability of the two parties choosing cooperation strategy is higher， the system is more likely to reach the stable state of tripartite cooperation. The factors such as original transaction cost and its reduction coefficient， government subsidies and cooperation benefits of the three parties have a positive effect on the evolution of the system towards cooperation. Setting a reasonable distribution coefficient of cooperation benefits can effectively drive tripartite cooperation. The cooperation cost of the three parties has a negative effect on the evolution of the system towards cooperation， and the lower the cost of each entity choosing to cooperate， the faster the system converges to the stable state of cooperation. The research results have a certain reference significance for optimizing the cooperation mechanism of the main body of the assembly building industry chain and guiding the cooperative development of the core enterprises in the industry chain.

Key words: construction industry chain, government intervention, cooperation strategy, evolutionary game, system dynamics

CLC Number:

F224

Zengke Yang,Ruiguo Fan,Wei Huang, et al. Research on Cooperation Strategy of Core Enterprises in Prefabricated Construction Industry Chain under Government Intervention[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(3): 28-39.

Figures/Tables 15

主体	符号	代表含义
设计单位	$c 1$	设计单位原始的交易成本（原始设计过程中产生的协调费用）
	$f 1$	设计单位所付的合作成本
	$t 1$	设计单位选择“不合作”的原始收益
	$e 1$	设计单位与构件生产商合作减少变更的收益
	$e 2$	设计单位与施工企业合作减少变更的收益
构件生产商	$c 2$	构件生产商原始的交易成本（构件生产过程中产生的协调费用）
	$f 2$	构件生产商所付的合作成本
	$t 2$	构件生产商选择“不合作”的原始收益
	$α$	构件生产商与设计单位合作时的交易成本降低系数
	$π$	施工企业与构件生产商合作可得额外收益（生产和施工效率提高、冲突减少所得的额外收益）
	$γ$	构件生产商与施工企业合作时构件生产商对额外收益的分配系数
施工企业	$c 3$	施工企业原始的交易成本（构件安装过程中产生的协调费用）
	$f 3$	施工企业所付的合作成本
	$t 3$	施工企业选择“不合作”的原始收益
	$β$	施工企业与设计单位合作时的交易成本降低系数
	$1 - γ$	构件生产商与施工企业合作时施工企业对额外收益的分配系数
政府	$A$	政府给予有合作意愿主体的合作补贴（财政补贴与金融支持等）

策略		设计单位
		合作		不合作
		施工企业合作	施工企业不合作	施工企业合作	施工企业不合作
构件生产商	合作	$A + t 1 + e 1 + e 2 - f 1 - c 1$ $A + t 2 + γ π - f 2 - 1 - α c 2$ $A + t 3 + 1 - γ π - f 3 - 1 - β c 3$	$A + t 1 + e 1 - f 1 - c 1$ $A + t 2 - f 2 - 1 - α c 2$ $t 3 - c 3$	$t 1 - c 1$ $A + t 2 + γ π - f 2 - c 2$ $A + t 3 + 1 - γ π - f 3 - c 3$	$t 1 - c 1$ $A + t 2 - f 2 - c 2$ $t 3 - c 3$
构件生产商	不合作	$A + t 1 + e 2 - f 1 - c 1$ $t 2 - c 2$ $A + t 3 - f 3 - 1 - β c 3$	$A + t 1 - f 1 - c 1$ $t 2 - c 2$ $t 3 - c 3$	$t 1 - c 1$ $t 2 - c 2$ $A + t 3 - f 3 - c 3$	$t 1 - c 1$ $t 2 - c 2$ $t 3 - c 3$

均衡点	特征值			稳定条件
均衡点	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$	稳定条件
$E 1 0,0, 0$	$A - f 1$	$A - f 2$	$A - f 3$	$λ 1 < 0$ $λ 2 < 0$ $λ 3 < 0$
$E 2 0,0, 1$	$A + e 2 - f 1$	$A + γ π - f 2$	$- A - f 3$
$E 3 0,1, 0$	$A + e 1 - f 1$	$- A - f 2$	$A + 1 - γ π - f 3$
$E 4 0,1, 1$	$A + e 1 + e 2 - f 1$	$- A + γ π - f 2$	$- A + 1 - γ π - f 3$
$E 5 1,0, 0$	$- A - f 1$	$A + α c 2 - f 2$	$A + β c 3 - f 3$
$E 6 1,0, 1$	$- A + e 2 - f 1$	$A + α c 2 + γ π - f 2$	$- A + β c 3 - f 3$
$E 7 1,1, 0$	$- A + e 1 - f 1$	$- A + α c 2 - f 2$	$A + β c 3 + 1 - γ π - f 3$
$E 8 1,1, 1$	$- A + e 1 + e 2 - f 1$	$- A + α c 2 + γ π - f 2$	$- A + β c 3 + 1 - γ π - f 3$

参数变量	初始值	参数变量	初始值
$c 1$	10	$t 3$	15
$c 2$	12	$α$	0.3
$c 3$	15	$β$	0.3
$f 1$	10	$e 1$	6
$f 2$	12	$e 2$	6
$f 3$	12	$π$	10
$t 1$	15	$γ$	0.5
$t 2$	15	$A$	7

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Research on Cooperation Strategy of Core Enterprises in Prefabricated Construction Industry Chain under Government Intervention

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