本文以电信服务与手机捆绑销售模式为背景，研究了手机制造商主导下公平关切对手机制造商和服务运营商进行捆绑分销合作时的价格和补贴决策、利润分配以及补贴契约协调的影响。首先，分别给出了集中决策和补贴契约下捆绑销售渠道的最优均衡结果；然后，分析了补贴契约下手机制造商的公平关切对手机制造商和服务运营商的均衡策略、渠道各方利润以及整体利润的影响；进一步地，对捆绑销售模式下的补贴契约进行了协调性分析。研究结果表明：不利不公平厌恶将促使手机制造商制定一个较高的零售价格，从而恶化捆绑销售渠道的整体效益；有利不公平厌恶将促使手机制造商制定一个较低的零售价格，从而改善捆绑销售渠道的整体效益；然而，无论是否考虑手机制造商公平关切心理行为，补贴契约始终不能促使捆绑销售渠道实现协调；此外，手机制造商一味追求较高的利润分配比，并不一定能给自身带来更多利润，反而会降低整体利润。
Recognizing the importance of fairness as well as the prevailing practice of telecom service and handset bundling in modern wireless businesses, the effects of the handset manufacturer's fairness concerns on the pricing and subsidy policy, the profit distribution, and the coordination of subsidy contract under a handset manufacturer-Stackelberg structure are examined in this paper. Specifically, a setting in which a telecom service operator cooperates with a handset manufacturer to deliver the complementary telecom service and handset to end consumers is considered. The handset manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and sets the handset retail price, while the service operator responds by setting the subsidy as a Stackelberg follower. This problem is modeled and solved based on the game theoretical paradigm. First, the equilibrium strategies and equilibrium profits for the centralized model and subsidy contract model are presented, respectively. Then, the effects of fairness concerns of the handset manufacturer on the equilibrium strategies of the handset manufacturer and the service operator, the channel members' profits, and the overall profit are analyzed. Furthermore, the channel coordination issue for the subsidy contract is investigated. The results show that the disadvantageous inequality aversion will promote the handset manufacturer to set a relatively higher retail price, and thus lead a deterioration of the overall performance. And the advantageous inequality aversion will promote the handset manufacturer to set a relatively lower retail price, and thus improve the overall performance. However, the channel coordination can not be achieved no matter the handset manufacturer cares about fairness or not. Besides, the results also show that blindly pursuing a high distributed ratio will not necessarily increase the handset manufacturer's profit and will reduce the overall profits. These results indicate that it is important to consider the fairness issue in telecom service and handset bundling, especially for the situation when a handset manufacturer cooperates with a relative disadvantageous service operator.
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