契约是促成供应链企业战略合作的重要纽带，在股权融资背景下有着新的内涵。本文研究了零售商股权融资时供应链的运作问题，刻画了契约结构对零售商股权融资的影响，建立了两类不同契约结构下的供应链运作模型。研究发现，零售商的股权融资行为极大地受到契约结构的影响：一方面，供应商主导的契约结构严重阻碍了零售商的股权融资意愿，不利于企业发展。另一方面，通过一类契约锁定协议可以提升零售商的融资意愿，实现多方共赢。揭示了契约结构在股权融资过程中的重要作用。
The combination of finance and the entity economy is the main trend of the "new normal" period of Chinese economy, and thus the equity investment industry has been vigorously supported by the policy. In addition to lack of funds, the development of business entities can do nothing without the support of supply chain, and it will be affected by the cooperation mode between the supply chain enterprises. Therefore, when financial institutions make equity investment to enterprises, they begin to consider the influence of supply chain, to consciously make acquisitions, mergers and even to build upstream and downstream to reduce the friction between the supply chain enterprises, and to accelerate the development of financing enterprises. However, this behavior is always costly, and the operation and market risk is completely borne by the investment and financing parties. The efficiency of the allocation of financial resources is reduced. Based on the realistic background, the impact of supply chain contract on the equity financing of growing retail enterprise is studied in this paper. It is assumed that the investment institution (in this paper, a private equity investment institution, PE,is considered) adopts P/B method (with P/B ratio as α) to valuation the retail enterprise, and the investment volume is B. The retailer holds a fixed asset A and own fund η, and then his stock share becomes to θ=(α(A+η))/(α(A+η)+B) after equity financing. It is considered that the retailer faces a random market demand ξ, where only the mean μ is known to him. With the help of equity financing, the retailer could expand the market demand from ξ to ξ+βe, where β represents the retail enterprise's growth-potential, and e represents the retailer's sales effort. The effort cost function is expressed as 1/2 se2, and retailer's selling price is p, and the supplier's unit cost is c. The Stackelberg version of the problem with the supplier act as the leader is explored, then the retailer needs to decide the optimal order quantity q to maximize his expected total asset TAR=θ(A+η+B+pmin{q,ξ+βe}-wq-1/2 se2) after the supplier chooses optimally the selling price w, which maximizes the supplier's profit function πs(w)=(w-c)q. Since the demand information is incomplete, a minimax regret criterion is taken to solve the optimization problem. Under two kinds of different supply chain contracts, the supplier and retailer's optimal decisions are obtained. It shows that the retailer's equity financing is greatly influenced by the contractual structure. On the one hand, the supplier-dominated contract structure seriously impedes the retailer's equity-willingness, and is not conducive to the development of enterprises. On the other hand, through a kind of contract locking protocol, the equity-willingness of the retailers can be improved and the win-win situation can be achieved. It reveals the significance and value of a reasonable settings of supply chain contract structure in the process of equity financing.
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