在CVaR风险度量准则下，构建了考虑随机需求与收入共享的风险规避型V2G备用决策模型，推导了集中和分散两种决策下渠道成员最优决策行为的解析解，并进一步比较分析了随机需求变量服从均匀分布时的均衡策略。研究发现，集中决策下的最优V2G备用预留因子与渠道整体的风险规避度正相关，而均衡时的V2G备用销售价格与渠道整体的风险规避度的相关性不确定，且受到随机需求变量的分布函数影响；分散决策下的最优V2G备用预留因子仅与电网公司的风险规避度有关，而均衡时的V2G备用销售价格受到电网公司的风险规避度、购电价格以及电动汽车用户收入共享系数等的共同影响；电动汽车用户的最优V2G备用收入共享系数与其风险规避度正相关，而与电网公司的风险规避度负相关。数值仿真结果表明，在绝大多数情形下收入共享合约并不能完美协调此类V2G备用渠道的分散决策行为。
The decision models for risk-averse V2G reserve considering stochastic demand and revenue sharing under the CVaR measurement criterion are proposed,and the analytical solutions of channel members' optimal decision behavior in the integrated and decentralized decision are derived. On this basis,the equilibrium strategies when the random demand variable follows the uniform distribution are comparatively analyzed. The research shows that the optimal V2G reserve factor under integrated decision is positively correlated with the channel overall risk aversion,while the relevance between equilibrium selling price of V2G and channel overall risk aversion is uncertain,and this uncertainty is affected by the distribution function of the stochastic demand variable. The optimal V2G reserve factor under decentralized decision is only related to the grid company' risk aversion,while the equilibrium selling price of V2G is affected by the common influence of risk aversion,purchasing price of grid company,and electric vehicle user' revenue sharing coefficient. The optimal V2G reserve revenue sharing coefficient of electric vehicle user is positively correlated with his risk aversion,but negatively related to the risk aversion of grid company. The results of numerical simulation indicate that revenue-sharing contract in the vast majority of cases does not perfectly coordinate decentralized decision behavior in V2G reserve channel.
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