针对产需不确定下单一供应商、制造商和风险规避的零售商组成的三级供应链系统，建立了分散和集中情况下的最优决策模型。通过设计风险共担和GL组合契约实现了三级供应链的协调。讨论了风险规避零售商的最优订购决策，分析了风险规避对供应链期望效益的影响。比较了风险规避和风险中性两种情况下零售商的最优决策。探讨了组合契约的协调问题及契约参数之间的关系。研究表明供应链的期望利润随着产需不确定的增加而减少，风险规避下零售商的期望利润低于风险中性时的期望利润，零售商的期望利润随着风险规避程度的加大而减少，零售商最优订购量随风险规避程度的增加而变化。最后数值算例验证了模型和契约协调的有效性。
The development of modern science and technology improves efficiency and shortens product cycle. At the same time, however it brings about the uncertainty and increased risk of supply chain. In recent years, researches on the uncertainty of supply chain output and demand are gradually concerned by scholars. But the researches were conducted usually under the assumption of the neutrality of a risk without consideration of the influence of risk preference on decision makers. In reality, decision makers usually show the characteristics of risk preference. In the paper, a three-echelon supply chain system is discussed, which consists of single supplier, manufacturer and retailer with risk aversion under yield and demand uncertain conditions. The optimal decision models of supply chain system are established under the mechanism of centralization and decentralization. The combined contract is applied to coordinate the three-echelon supply chain system mentioned above. Contract mechanism is the common method used in supply chain coordination. A risk-sharing contract and a GL contract are introduced to coordinate supply chain against the deficiencies brought about by the use of single contract to coordinate the three-echelon supply chain. The GL contract is the improved profit-sharing contract, including both gains and losses of supply chain members. The contract mechanism is described as follows:①the GL contract is applied between manufacturers and retailers, with a parameter(β,γ).β is manufacturers' profit sharing proportion to retailers, and γis sharing proportion of manufacturers' losses to retailers. The profit proportion of retailers is (1-β), and the loss proportion is (1-γ). ②the risk-sharing contract is applied between suppliers and manufacturers. The following conclusions are achieved by the analysis of the number example. First, the expected profit of supply chain decreases with the increase of demand uncertainty(λ). Second, the expected profit of supply chain increases with the increase of random output factor(σ)of manufacturers and suppliers. Finally, the expected profit of retailers decreases with the increase of degree of risk aversion. The order quality of retailers changes with the increase of risk aversion. The validity of models and contract coordination is illustrated by a numerical example.
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