主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 84-98.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.2337cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.2337

• • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑个人数据产权分配的竞争企业个性化服务提供策略及福利分析

范昊雯1, 张玉林2()   

  1. 1.河海大学商学院,江苏 南京 211100
    2.东南大学经济管理学院,江苏 南京 211189
  • 收稿日期:2024-12-24 修回日期:2025-07-01 出版日期:2026-11-25 发布日期:2026-11-10
  • 通讯作者: 张玉林 E-mail:zhangyl@seu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD118);国家社会科学基金青年项目(25CGL069);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(B250207014);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目(2025SJYB0047)

Personalization Strategy and Welfare Analysis under Personal Data Ownership Allocation in Competitive Markets

Haowen Fan1, Yulin Zhang2()   

  1. 1.Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China
    2.School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China
  • Received:2024-12-24 Revised:2025-07-01 Online:2026-11-25 Published:2026-11-10
  • Contact: Yulin Zhang E-mail:zhangyl@seu.edu.cn

摘要:

数据驱动的个性化服务面临数据要素价值释放与个人隐私保护之间的矛盾。为平衡数据价值释放与隐私保护,数据要素市场正积极探索基于数据产权分配的治理路径。本文考虑个性化服务引致的消费者服务体验提升与隐私关切,研究具有不同数据利用能力的竞争企业的个性化服务提供策略,探讨个人数据产权分配如何重塑市场竞争格局及其福利影响。研究发现,个人数据产权分配给企业时,企业总是选择提供个性化服务。个人数据产权分配给消费者时,仅当数据给企业带来的收益较高且消费者隐私关切水平较低时,企业才会提供个性化服务。个人数据产权分配给消费者能够弱化企业个性化服务导致的服务价格竞争,但这不一定能够提高企业利润。当数据给企业带来的收益较高且消费者隐私关切水平适中时,个人数据产权分配给消费者能够提高消费者剩余;否则,个人数据产权分配给消费者反而会导致自主悖论,即尽管赋予了消费者对其数据的自主决策权,但消费者剩余却减少。本文研究结论对实现数据要素市场中个人数据利用与隐私保护的平衡具有指导意义。

关键词: 个性化服务, 个人数据产权分配, 隐私关切, 数据收益, 市场竞争

Abstract:

In the era of big data, massive consumer data has emerged as a key driver of productivity growth. Firms deliver personalized value to consumers through data-driven personalized services. Although substantial economic value has been generated from large amounts of individual data through personalization, data privacy concerns associated with it have always been a challenge. The allocation of personal data ownership between firms and end-users is widely recognized as an essential measure to address privacy issues of personalized services. Personal data ownership allocation can change the way firms amass and use individual data. Namely, under stringent privacy regulations, consumers are entitled to choose how much data they want to share with firms. The purpose of this study is to examine how data ownership allocation impacts firms’ personalization strategies in competitive markets with privacy concerns, as well as implications for stakeholders. A game-theoretic model is employed to investigate the personalization strategies of competing firms under different data ownership allocations and address the impact of data ownership allocation on firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Two scenarios are considered: (i) empowering firms with data ownership and (ii) empowering consumers with data ownership. The results reveal that both firms adopt personalized services with firm control over data. However, with consumer control over data, both firms adopt personalized services only if consumer privacy concerns are low and the monetary value of data is high. Assigning data ownership to consumers can mitigate the price competition caused by personalized services; however, firms may end up worse off than when data ownership is assigned to firms themselves. The findings also underscore an autonomy paradox, i.e., empowering consumers to decide how much data to provide for personalized services may not necessarily improve consumer surplus. Assigning data ownership to consumers can improve consumer surplus when consumer privacy concerns are at moderate levels and the monetary value of data is high. This work has implications for firms on personalized service adoption and provides insights for policy makers on the effect of personal data ownership allocation on consumer welfare.

Key words: personalized service, personal data ownership allocation, privacy concerns, data revenue, market competition

中图分类号: